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THE SEC'S RULE 1Ob-6: PRESERVING A COMPETITIVE
MARKET DURING DISTRIBUTIONS
The recent Georgia-Padfic litigation serves to reiterate the broad
question posed by the Special Study of the Securities Markets con-
cerning the precise limits of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's proscription of bidding and purchasing by interested -per-
sons during the course of a distribution. While the SEC has
affirmed the need for clarification of some applications of the
protean regulation, no definitive -analysis has been forthcoming.
In an attempt to ascertain the current view of the Commission
with respect to enforcement of the prohibition and to isolate the
more troublesome issues raised by the rule, this comment examines
the background of the promulgation of rule 10b-6 as well as its
major administrative and judicial interpretations.
THE Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of
19342 were both motivated to a large extent by a desire to prevent
investors' losses due to market manipulations.3 The foundation
upon which a regulatory framework was to be constructed lay in
section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act.4 Through this provision, Congress
has directed the Securities and Exchange Commission to prescribe
such antimanipulation rules and regulations as are "necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 5
Pursuant to this authorization, the Commission in 1955 promulgated
rule 10b-6, 6 which, with specified exemptions, proscribes bidding and
148 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964).
2 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1964).
3 In his message to Congress calling for federal regulation of securities exchanges,
President Roosevelt objected to "pool[s] of individuals or corporations with large re-
sources... which sought by manipulation to raise or depress market quotations ......
H.R. RE.P. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934). Similarly, the Senate Report on
the proposed Securities Exchange Act noted that "several devices are employed for the
purpose of artificially raising or depressing security prices. Those which appear to
serve no legitimate function are specifically prohibited." S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1934). See also STAFF OF SENATE Comm. ON BANKING AND CURRENcY, 73d
CONG., 2d Sxss., Report Relative to Stock Exchange Regulation 13-16 (Comm. Print
1934). See generally 3 Loss, SEcuRrrms REGULATION 1529-40 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as Loss]; Berle, Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, 31 COLUm. L. REv. 264
(1931); Berie, Stock Market Manipulation, 38 COLUm. L. REv. 393 (1938); Moore &
Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the Exchange Act, 2 U. CHI. L. RFv. 46 (1934).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10 (b), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1964).
Ibid.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1964, Supp. 1966) reads as follows:
"(a) It shall constitute a 'manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance' as used
in section 10 (b) of the act for any person,
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(1) who is an underwriter or prospective underwriter in a particular distribution of
securities, or
(2) who is the issuer or other person on whose behalf such a distribution is being
made, or
(3) who is a broker, dealer, or other person who has agreed to participate or is
participating in such a distribution, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, either alone or with one or more other persons, to bid
for or purchase for any account in which he has a beneficial interest, any security
which is the subject of such distribution, or any security of the same class and series,
or any right to purchase any such security, or to attempt to induce any person to
purchase any such security or right, until after he has completed his participation in
such distribution: Provided, however, That this section shall not prohibit (i) trans-
actions in connection with the distribution effected otherwise than on a securities
exchange with the issuer or other person or persons on whose behalf such distribution
is being made or among underwriters, prospective underwriters or other persons who
have agreed to participate or are participating in such distribution; (ii) unsolicited
privately negotiated purchases, each involving a substantial amount of such security,
effected neither on a securities exchange nor from or through a broker or dealer; or
(iii) purchases by an issuer effected more than forty days after the commencement of
the distribution for .the purpose of satisfying a sinking fund or similar obligation to
which it is subject; or (iv) odd-lot transactions (and the off-setting round-lot transac-
tions hereinafter referred to) by a person registered as an odd-lot dealer in such
security on a national securities exchange who offsets such odd-lot transactions in such
security by round-lot transactions as promptly as possible; or (v) brokerage transactions
not involving solicitation of the customer's order; or (vi) offers to sell or the solicitation
of offers to buy the securities being distributed (including securities or rights acquired
in stabilizing) or securities or rights offered as principal by the person making such
offer to sell or solicitation; or (vii) the exercise of any right or conversion privilege to
acquire any security; or (viii) stabilizing transactions not in violation of § 240.10b-7; or
(ix) bids for or purchases of rights not in violation of § 240.10b-8; or (x) transactions
effected on a national securities exchange in accordance with the provisions of a plan
filed by such exchange under § 240.10b-2 (d) and declared effective by the Commission;
or (xi) purchases or bids by an underwriter, prospective underwriter or dealer otherwise
than on a securities exchange, 10 or more business days prior to the proposed com-
mencement of such distribution (or 5 or more business days in the case of unsolicited
purchases), if none of such purchases or bids are for the purpose of creating actual,
or apparent, active trading in or raising the price of such security. In the case of
securities offered pursuant to an effective registration statement under the Securities
Act of 1933 the distribution shall not be deemed to commence for purposes of this
subdivision prior to the effective date of the registration statement.
"(b) The distribution of a security (1) which is immediately exchangeable for or
convertible into another security, or (2) which entitles the holder thereof immediately
to acquire another security, shall be deemed to include a distribution of such other
security within the meaning of this section.
"(c) The following shall be applicable for the purposes of this section.
(1) The term 'underwriter' means a person who has agreed with an issuer or other
person on whose behalf a distribution is to be made (i) to purchase securities for
distribution or (ii) to distribute securities for or on behalf of such issuer or other
person or (iii) to manage or supervise a distribution of securities for or on behalf of such
issuer or other person.
(2) The term 'prospective underwriter' means a person (i) who has agreed to submit
or has submitted a bid to become an underwriter of securities as to which the issuer,
or other person on whose behalf the distribution is to be made, has issued a public
invitation for bids, or (ii) who has reached an understanding, with the issuer or other
person on whose behalf a distribution is to be made, that he will become an under-
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purchasing during the course of a distribution by an underwriter,
issuer, or other person participating in the offering. Because this
rule is so closely related to the other SEC provisions directed against
manipulative market transactions, many activities which violate its
terms also fall within the prohibition of these other regulations.7
Yet by focusing on acquisitions during distributions, rule lOb-6 gains
independent significance and becomes particularly relevant to corpo-
rate financing. In an attempt to ascertain the impact of this rule
upon securities marketing methods, this comment will trace the
development of rule 1Ob-6, outline its operation with a particular
inquiry into its application in the recent Georgia-Pacific8 litigation,
and evaluate the rule's significance as an antimanipulation regula-
tion.
Pre-lOb-6 regulation of market manipulation. Pre-1955 interpre-
tations of the antimanipulation provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
writer, whether or not the terms and conditions of the undervriting have been
agreed upon.
(3) A person shall be deemed to have completed his participation in a particular
distribution as follows: (i) The issuer or other person on whose behalf such distribution
is being made, when such distribution is completed; (ii) an underwriter, when he has
distributed his participation, including all other securities of the same class acquired in
connection with the distribution, and any stabilization arrangements and trading re-
strictions with respect to such distribution to which he is a party have been terminated;
(iii) any other person, when he has distributed his participation. A person, including
an underwriter or dealer, shall be deemed for purposes of this subparagraph to have
distributed securities acquired by him for investment.
(e) The provisions of this rule shall not apply to any distribution of securities by
an issuer to its employees, or to employees of its subsidiaries, or to a trustee or other
person acquiring such securities for the account of such employees, pursuant to (1) a
stock option plan involving only 'qualified stock options,' or qualifying as an 'employee
stock purchase plan' as those terms are defined in sections 422 and 423 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, or 'restricted stock options' as defined in section
424(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended: provided however, that for
the purposes of this paragraph an option which meets all of the conditions of that
section other than the date of issuance shall be deemed to be 'restricted stock options';
or (2) a savings, investment, or stock purchase plan providing for both (i) periodic
payments (or payroll deductions) for acquisition of securities by participating em-
ployees and (ii) periodic purchases of the securities by participating employees, or the
person acquiring them for the account of such employees.
"(1) This section shall not prohibit any transaction or transactions if the Commis-
sion, upon written request or upon its own motion, exempts such transaction or trans-
actions, either unconditionally or on specified terms and conditions, as not constituting
a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance comprehended within the purpose
of this section."
7 See note 41 infra.
8 SECv. Georgia-Pacific Corp., '64-'66 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91692 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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prohibited many activities which are now proscribed by rule lOb-6.0
Thus, artificially raising the market price of a security in order to
obtain a more favorable return from an offering was found to be one
of the acts which the statutes were designed to prohibit.'0 Also held
to be illegally manipulative was any attempt, whether in the course
of a distribution or otherwise, to affect the "outside" or investors'
market by placing increasingly higher bids in the "inside" or dealers'
market." A broker-dealer could violate the regulations even though
he had not engaged in the manipulative trading himself, but rather
had collaborated with the primary violator. 2 Moreover, the burden
under section 9 (a) of demonstrating that the apparent active trading
was undertaken "for the purpose of inducing a purchase" was less-
ened by the ruling that a prima facie violation would result from a
showing that a person with a substantial, direct pecuniary interest
in the success of a proposed offering had sought to raise the market
9 The 1933 and 1934 acts contain broad prohibitions against manipulative activities.
Section 17 (a) (3) of the Securities Act makes it unlawful for any person, in the offer
or sale of securities, "to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 48 Stat. 84, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (3) (1964). Section 9 (a) (2) of the Exchange Act prohibits
transactions which would create a false or misleading appearance of active trading
in any security registered on a national exchange for the purpose of inducing a
purchase or sale. 48 Stat. 889, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (a) (2) (1964). Another paragraph of this
section is specifically directed against wash sales or sales in which there is "no change
in the beneficial ownership" of the security. 48 Stat. 889, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (a) (1) (A)
(1964). Section 9 (a) also proscribes matched orders or "orders for the sale [or purchase]
of any . . . security with the knowledge that an order or orders of substantially the
same size, at substantially the same time, and at substantially the same price, for the
purchase [or sale, if the first mentioned transaction were a purchase] of such security,
has been or will be entered by or for the same or different parties." 48 Stat. 889, 15
U.S.C. 78i (a) (1) (B), (C) (1964). Finally, under § 15 (c) (1) broker-dealers are prohibit-
ed from employing "any manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or con-
trivance" to effect transactions in, or induce purchases or sales of, securities traded over-
the-counter. 48 Stat. 895, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (c) (1) (1964).
1 0 E.g., Adams & Co., 33 S.E.C. 444 (1952) (§ 17 (a) of the Securities Act and §§ 10 (b)
and 9 (a) (2) of the Exchange Act); Thornton & Co., 28 S.E.C. 208, afl'd, 171 F.2d 702
(2d Cir. 1948) (§§ 9 (a) (1) and (2), 10 (b), and 15 (c) (1) of the Exchange Act); Kidder,
Peabody & Co., 18 S.E.C. 559 (1945) (§§ 9 (a) (2) and 15 (c) (1) of the Exchange Act);
Russell Maguire & Co., 10 S.E.C. 332 (1941) (§ 17 (a) of the Securities Act and § 9 (a) (2)
of the Exchange Act).
21 E.g., R. L. Emacio & Co., 35 S.E.C. 191 (1953) (§ 17 (a) of the Securities Act and
§§ 10 (b) and 15 (c) (1) of the Exchange Act); Floyd A. Allen & Co., 35 S.E.C. 176 (1953)
(§ 17 (a) of the Securities Act and §§ 10 (b) and 15 (c) (1) of the Exchange Act); Barrett
& Co., 9 S.E.C. 319 (1941) (§ 15 (c) (1) of the Exchange Act).
12 See Russell Maguire & Co., 10 S.E.C. 332 (1941).
Similarly, an underwriter could be penalized by suspension of his registration if a
salesman in his firm had requested another trader to create activity in the security
being distributed. See Kidder, Peabody & Co., 18 S.E.C. 559, 571 (1945).
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price for outstanding securities of the same issuer.'3 Also, any activity
which would violate section 9 (a) (2) if the security were registered
on a national exchange was held to violate sections 17 (a) and 15 (c)
if it were not.14
Administrative pronouncements presented with more specificity
the restrictions to be observed by broker-dealers. In response to an
inquiry by a practitioner, the Commission refused to allow the
trading department of a firm to buy without restriction securities
which were the subject of a distribution by the firm's retailing
department.' 5 The Commission ruled that, regardless of depart-
mentalization, a firm was to be viewed as a single business organiza-
tion. Also to be scrutinized were purchases by a managing under-
writer to cover a syndicate short position 6 while the members of the
selling group were still engaged in the retail distribution of the
security17 or while individual underwriters still held unsold blocks
13 The Federal Corp., 25 S.E.C. 227, 230 (1947). Similarly, in an administrative
release issued four years prior to The Federal Corp., the SEC had announced that any
purchase made to facilitate a distribution would be deemed to have been made with
the "intention or purpose of inducing the purchase of the offered security by others."
Opinion of Director of the Trading and Exchange Division, SEC Exchange Act Release
No. 3506 (November 11, 1943).
1" Halsey, Stuart 8 Co., 30 S.E.C. 106, 110-12 (1949); Barrett 9- Co., 9 S.E.C. 319, 328
(1941). The assertion that § 9 (a) prohibitions are applicable to transactions in securi-
ties not traded on a national exchange apparently involved a statement of general
policy and was not intended to imply that the section would be literally applied to all
such transactions. In SEC Exchange Act Release No. 1680 (April 29, 1938), the Com-
mission announced its adoption of a rule pursuant to § 10 (b) which extended the pro-
hibitions of § 9 (a) regarding securities registered on the national exchanges to securities
traded over-the-counter or on an exempt exchange. In SEC Exchange Act Release No.
1689 (May 3, 1938), the effectiveness of this rule was partially suspended. Finally in
1941, the rule was repealed altogether "since it does not appear that the rule will
be helpful as a clarification and since its present status may lead to confusion." Barrett
& Co., supra at 330. The motivation for the repeal stemmed from a recognition that
certain language in § 9 (a) was so geared to the workings of an exchange market that
its literal application to the over-the-counter market would be misleading. See 3
Loss 1566-67; Andresen, Manipulation of Over-the-Counter Securities Markets, 10 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 639, 643-45 (1942). The applicability of principles developed under
§ 9 (a) to proceedings against dealers in the over-the-counter market has been ques-
tioned. See Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 509, 531-33 (1947).
Il Opinion of Director of the Trading and Exchange Division, SEC Exchange Act
Release No. 3505 (November 16, 1943).
20 A broker-dealer is said to have a short position in a security when the firm has
sold a quantity of the security greater than that which it owns. This situation is
possible because delivery of securities may be made several days subsequent to their
sale. Conversely, if a broker-dealer is obligated to deliver less than its entire trading
inventory of a particular security, it has a long position. See Bloomenthal, The Case
of the Subtle Motive and the Delicate Art-Control and Domination in Over-the-
Counter Securities Markets, 1960 DuKE L.J. 196, 198 n.3.
17 Opinion of Director of the Trading and Exchange Division, SEC Exchange Act
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of the security.'8 Similarly, a syndicate member who had sold his
allotment could not resume his normal trading activities until he
was certain that any stabilization undertaken by the managing under-
writer had ceased. 19 Eventually, the Commission's rulings were inter-
preted to require suspension of active trading altogether by any
broker-dealer involved in the underwriting or promotion of a distri-
bution.20
Promulgation of rule 10b-6. Rule lOb-6, as finally promulgated,
is consistent with pre-19 55 judicial and administrative decisions in
prohibiting activities which are the primary means by which market
manipulation might be effected in connection with a public offering.
The initial proposal of rule lOb-6, 21 made in 1954, stated the pro-
Release No. 3506 (November 16, 1943). The position taken by the SEC appeared to
be that purchases made during the course of a distribution to cover the short position
would be assumed to have been made for the purpose of facilitating the distribution
unless external factors indicated otherwise. Factors which the Commission evaluated
in deciding if purchases were so made include whether the independent market price
was above the price established for the offered securities and whether the syndicate
manager had attempted to acquire shares away from the market, such as in privately
negotiated transactions.
281bid. While the Commission did not categorically prohibit purchases on the
market to cover the syndicate short position when individuals were still long in the
security, it did say that "it would also seem appropriate for the agreement between
underwriters to contain provisions requiring the individual underwriters, upon request
of the manager, to deliver to him unsold securities . for the purpose of reducing
the syndicate short position." Ibid.
19 Opinion of Director of the Trading and Exchange Division, SEC Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 3505 (November 16, 1943).
20 See Foshay, Market Activities of Participants in Securities Distributions, 45 VA. L.
R1Lv. 907, 911-12 (1959). The SEC apparently did not view the restrictions on trading
activities during a distribution to be applicable to unsolicited brokerage transactions,
privately negotiated purchases made off the open market, and purchases by broker-
dealers who, even though they were involved in a distribution of the security, were
ordinarily the primary market-makers for that security. Ibid.
A case which may have provided much of the impetus for the promulgation of rule
lob-6 was Halsey, Stuart & Co., 30 S.E.C. 106 (1949), which involved a dealer who had
managed the underwriting of a $45,000,000 bond issue in the over-the-counter market.
Violations of § 17 (a) of the Securities Act and §§ 10 (b) and 15 (c) (I) of the Exchange
Act were found when the broker-dealer conducted extensive trading in the bonds while
attempting to dispose of a portion of the offering which had not been sold during
the registered distribution. The significance of .the case lies in its consolidation of
principles previously presented by the Commission. See note 14 supra and accom-
panying text. Further, the decision presented a summary of the philosophy motivating
the application of the antimanipulation provisions to purchasing by the distributing
dealer during the course of an offering: "Actual buying with the design to create
activity, prevent price falls, or raise prices for the purpose of inducing others to buy
is to distort the character of the market as a reflection of the combined judgments of
buyers and sellers, and to make of it a stage-managed performance." 30 S.E.C. at 112.
21 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 5040 (May 18, 1954), reprinted at 19 Fed. Reg.
2986 (1954).
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hibitions only in general terms. Bidding and purchasing were pro-
scribed for "any person who has reasonable cause to believe that
he will participate, has agreed to participate, or is participating, in a
particular distribution of a security." 22 Since the proposed rule did
not prescribe when the prohibition was to commence, the Commis-
sion apparently intended that bidding and purchasing should cease as
soon as a person could be said to have qualified under the quoted
terminology. Also, while some of the exemptions specified under
the present form of the rule were available,2 no provision was made
for granting exceptions in unanticipated situations in which applica-
tion of the rule was not intended.24
Included in the original proposal was a request by the Secretary
of the Commission for comments by practitioners. 25  In response
to this invitation came numerous observations and criticisms directed
toward the indefiniteness of the proposed rule. Those responding
recognized that the term distribution had no well-defined meaning
and might apply to transactions upon which limitations had not pre-
viously been imposed.26  Moreover, the complaint was raised that
much uncertainty would result as to when the prohibition was to
commence and terminate.27 As a possible resolution of this difficulty
it was suggested that the Commission choose a specific point in time
prior to a distribution at which trading should cease.28 Similarly,
2219 Fed. Reg. at 2986 (1954).
23 Exemptions allowed under the current formulation of lOb-6 which were present
in the original proposal include clauses (i), (iv)- (vi), and (viii)- (x). Paragraphs (c)
through (f) were added subsequent to the 1954 version. Compare ibid with note 6
supra. See generally notes 223-33 infra and accompanying text.
"See 19 Fed. Reg. 2986 (1954).
2 See id. at 2988.
"8 See Letter From Charles C. Glavin, Vice President, First Boston Corporation, to
the Securities and Exchange Commission, June 24, 1954; Letter From John F. Ferguson,
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
June 18, 1954; Letter From Philip A. Loomis, Jr., O'Melveny & Myers, to the Securities
and Exchange Commission, June 11, 1954.
27 See Letter From David V. Stern, Jr., Schumacher, Gilmore, Van Ness & Stem, to
the Securities and Exchange Commission, June 18, 1954; Letter From John F. Ferguson,
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
June 17, 1954, at 2: "At what point of time must the person to whom the general
prohibition applies refrain from a bid, purchase or inducement to purchase and when
may he resume such activity? It seems to us that the time to refrain is so indefinite
and uncertain . . . and the penalty . . . so stringent that this provision of the
general prohibition should be eliminated."
2 See Letter From John Mulford, Acting Chairman, American Bar Association,
to the Securities and Exchange Commission, June 18, 1954 (seven days prior to distribu-
tion); Letter From David V. Stem, Jr., Schumacher, Gilmore, Van Ness & Stern, to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, June 18, 1954 ("some arbitrary point of time").
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practitioners were almost unanimous in their anticipation of difficulty
in distinguishing the classes of persons to whom the prohibition was
to extend. 9 Besides noting that the Commission had reserved no
ad hoc power to grant exceptions,0 " the critics recognized that the
listed exemptions included no allowance for the continuation of
normal trading activities31-especially those transactions which would
not directly affect the market price of an offered security.82
The final form of lOb-6,23 adopted July 5, 1955, preserves the
broad scope of the initial proposal but includes additions which are
responsive to some of the proffered criticisms. As in the original
proposal, the regulatory effect of the rule is directed exclusively to
the trader's market activities during a public offering.3 4 Further,
29 See Letter From Sullivan 8- Cromwell to the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, June 30, 1954; Letter From Charles C. Glavin, Vice President, First Boston Corpo-
ration, to the Securities and Exchange Commission, June 24, 1954.
"See Letter From Charles C. Glavin, Vice President, First Boston Corporation, to
the Securities and Exchange Commission, June 24, 1954 at 2: "There are so many kinds
of purchases of a security that it is difficult to foresee all of them. Most would be
perfectly proper. Consequently, the rule should have an 'escape valve' to provide
latitude to .the Commission to permit exceptions to the rule when such exceptions are
deemed appropriate."
31 One of the most pointed responses criticized the Commission's proposal as in-
consistent with the practices permitted under the accepted interpretations of .the other
antimanipulation provisions. Activties which a group of practitioners felt should
be allowed to continue despite a trader's participation in a distribution included (I)
purchases for the trader's investment account which were made in accordance with
his normal investment activity, (2) exercise of rights or conversion privileges in respect
to securities beneficially held, (3) purchases to cover short positions or sales to liquidate
long positions which had resulted from normal trading prior to the distribution, and
(4) solicitation with a view to acquisition of large blocks of shares privately held.
These proposals were included in a letter to Ralph H. Demmler, Chairman, Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, and signed by Edward H. Ladd III, Chairman, First
Boston Corporation; Eugene E. Barry, Shields & Co.; Philip W. Brown, Smith, Barney
& Co.; Frank J. Coyle, New York Stock Exchange; Paul Devlin, Blyth & Co.; Herbert S.
Hall, Morgan Stanley & Co.; William D. Kerr, Baccon, Whipple & Co.; and Charles L.
Morse, Jr., Hemphill, Noyes & Co.
It is significant to note that while none of the practices listed above was permissible
under a literal reading of the initially proposed version of lOb-6, the form of the rule
finally adopted specifically exempted (2) and (4). See note 6 supra.
'1 See Memorandum From Win. Ward Foshay, Sullivan & Cromwell, to the Securities
and Exchange Commission, February 21, 1955.
For example, while lOb-6 (a) allows certain types of purchases made pursuant to
unsolicited offers, a feeling still exists among practitioners that purchases which are
privately negotiated, whether or not originally solicited by the trader, should be
exempted. See Memorandum to Clients from Sullivan & Cromwell, May 12, 1966.
38A revised proposal of the rule was presented in SEC Exchange Release No. 5159
(April 19, 1955), reprinted at 20 Fed. Reg. 2826 (1955). This revised form was
officially adopted without substantive alteration in SEC Exchange Act Release No.
5194 (July 5, 1955), reprinted in final form at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1964, Supp. 1966).
34 By contrast, § 17 of the Securities Act and §§ 9 (a) and 15 (c) of the Exchange Act
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only bidding and purchasing are proscribed.3 5 The prohibition of
these activities is absolute3 6 and extends to both exchange37 and over-
are applied without regard to the phase of the trader's operation which is called into
question. Compare Halsey, Stuart & Co., 30 S.E.C. 106 (1949) with M. S. Wien & Co.,
23 S.E.C. 735 (1946).
Certain other trading rules adopted by the Commission pursuant to statutory pro-
visions are directed solely to the area of distributions, but none of these presents a
complete prohibition on trading. Rule lOb-2 prohibits any individual "participating
or otherwise financially interested in" a distribution from compensating any person for
soliciting the purchase of a distributed security or for purchasing any such security for
any account other than that of the person paying the compensation. An exemption is
allowed for any compensation paid in accordance with a plan which has been filed with
the SEC by a national exchange. Also, the prohibition does not encompass salaries
paid to regular employees. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-2 (1964); see also Whitney, Rule 10b-6:
The Special Study's Rediscovered Rule, 2 Mich. L. Rav. 567, 585 n.74 (1964). Rule
15cl-6 requires a broker-dealer to disclose his interest in an over-.the-counter distribu-
tion. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-6 (1964). Rule 15cl-8 requires offers made "at the market"
during a nonexchange distribution to have reference to a competitive market. 17
C.F.R. §240.15d-8 (1964).
The unique problems presented during a distribution were summarized by the
Commission in Bruns, Nordeman 8: Co., 40 S.EC. 652, 660 n.ll (1961): "A person con-
.templating or making a distribution has an obvious incentive to artificially influence
the market price of the securities in order to facilitate the distribution or to increase
its profitability."
3 On the other hand, § 17 of the Securities Act makes unlawful "any transaction
.which ...would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." (Emphasis
added.) Sections 9 (a) and 15 (c) of the Exchange Act apply with a similar breadth. See
note 9 supra.
36 The lOb-6 concept of distribution partially subsumes the intent requirement of
§ 9. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. Yet, lOb-6 clearly goes beyond pro-
hibiting only manipulative purchases. For example, purchases for an employee stock
plan, which are prohibited during a distribution without a showing of fraudulent pur-
pose, see Foshay, supra note 20, at 933-37, cannot presumptively be viewed as induce-
ment for others to enter the market as might excessively active trading.
In many decisions a "willful" violation of lOb-6 is found. See, e.g., C. A. Benson
& Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7044 (March 26, 1963); Bruns, Nordeman & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 652 (1961). Such a findifig is not required by the rule, but is necessary
under § 15 (b) (5) of the Securities Exchange Act in order to justify revocation of a
broker-dealer's registration. See 78 Stat. 571, 15 U.S.C. 78o (b) (5) (1964). Consequently,
a proceeding against an "issuer or other person on whose behalf the distribution is
made" need not consider the willfulness of the violation: a showing need only be made
that there is an intent to do the act which violates .the law. See Tager v. SEC, 344
F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965); Bruns, Nordeman & Co., supra at 659. While no decision
has specified the precise nature of the prohibited activity, the majority of cases involve
purchasing with the intent to raise the market price of a security. However, in view
of the absolute nature of the prohibition on purchasing, acquisitions prompted by a
non-price-raising motive would be equally unlawful. Cf. SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co.,
183 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Though the Commission has asserted that
it would revoke the registration of a broker-dealer who sought only to support the then
current market price, see ibid., no case has been reported in which this type of
violation was for a purpose other than directly to facilitate the distribution. None-
theless, it is established that in injunction proceedings all that need be shown is a
violation of some regulation under the 1933 or the 1934 act. See SEC v. R. A. Holman
& Co., '64-'66 CCH FD. SEC. L. RaP. 91554 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 366 F.2d 455 (2d
Cir. 1966).
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the-counter 8 market transactions. In answer to practitioner criti-
cism, lOb-6 (a) enumerated three categories of persons to whom the
prohibition extended: underwriters, other participating broker-
dealers, and issuers or other persons for whom the distribution is
made. 9 Furthermore, besides an attempted specification of the
period of prohibition,40 the newer formulation includes a reservation
by the Commission of an ad hoc power to grant exemptions.41
The Commission has consistently ruled that sanctions will be imposed despite a
showing that the public sustained no loss by the attempts to affect the distribution.
Thus, proof that the efforts of the individual against whom proceedings have been
initiated were unsuccessful is of no consequence. Russell Maguire & Co., 10 S.E.C.
332, 350-51 (1941). Nor is the individual benefited by the fact that the market price
would have risen even without his intervention. See Sidney Tager, SEC Exchange Act
Release No. 7368 (July 14, 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965); Gob Shops of
America, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 92, 101 (1959). Similarly, it is no defense that a bona fide
belief existed that the securities were underpriced at their premanipulation level. Gob
Shops of America, Inc., supra at 101-02; Halsey, Stuart & Co., 30 S.E.C. 106, 112
(1949). See also Affidavit in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, p. 3, SEC
v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., '64-'66 CCH FE. SEC. L. REP. 91692 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Finally,
just as the individual is not assisted by a showing that independent broker-dealers sup-
ported the price of the security after it had been manipulated, see, e.g., Shearson, Ham-
mill & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7743 (November 12, 1965); J. H. Goddard &
Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7618 (June 4, 1965); Theodore A. Landau d/b/a
Landau Co., 40 S.E.C. 1119, 1126 (1962), he will not be benefited by a claim that
skilled investors actually purchased the stock at the artificial price level. See Russell
Maguire & Co., supra at 349-50.
8 Section 9 of the Exchange Act, on the other hand, applies only to activities
on a national exchange. See note 9 supra.
38 By contrast, the applicability of § 15 (c) is limited to the over-the-counter market.
See ibid.
89 See note 6 supra for the text of the rule. The limitations imposed by § 15 (c) of
the Exchange Act apply only .to broker-dealers and do not extend to an "issuer or other
person on whose behalf such a distribution is made." See note 9 supra.
0 See lOb-6 (a) (xi) and (c) (3), note 6 supra. See generally notes 176-204 infra and
accompanying text.
4 See lOb-6 (f), note 6 supra.
Despite the distinctive nature of lOb-6, decisions under the other antimanipulation
provisions have precedential value when lOb-6 is invoked. For example, the 1949
decision in Halsey, Stuart 8& Co., 30 S.E.C. 106, has been cited in SEC v. Scott Taylor
& Co., 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); J. H. Goddard & Co., SEC Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 7618 (June 4, 1965); Theodore A. Landau d/b/a Landau Co., 40 S.E.C. 1119
(1962); Bruns, Nordeman & Co., 40 S.E.C. 652 (1961); and Gob Shops of America, Inc.,
39 S.E.C. 92 (1959), as an exemplification of the Commission's philosophy that pur-
chasing by a trader involved in a distribution distorts the competitive nature of a
securities market. This use of precedent is consistent with the Commission's view, ex-
pressed upon promulgation of the rule, that lOb-6 is a "formulation of principles which
historically have been applied in considering questions relating to manipulative
activity." SEC Exchange Act Release No. 5040 (May 18, 1954), reprinted at 19 Fed.
Reg. 2986 (1954). See also SEC Exchange Act Release No. 5194 (July 5, 1955), re-
printed at 20 Fed. Reg. 5075 (1955). Further, many activities which would amount
to violations of lOb-6 could be, and often are, prosecuted as violations of other anti-
manipulation sections. For example, any apparent or actual activity created by pur-
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Despite the inclusion of those new elements, later case develop-
ments have revealed the presence of many difficulties in the practical
interpretation of the rule. Especially troublesome is the lack of a
definitive analysis of the term distribution. Also, extensive admin-
istrative and judicial constructions have been needed to clarify fur-
ther when the prohibition against bidding and purchasing commences
and terminates. The remainder of this comment focuses upon the
resolutions offered and further problems presented by the decisional
analysis given to the concept of distribution and to the duration of
the period of prohibition. Also to be considered are the types of
activities prohibited, the classes of persons to whom the prohibition
extends, and the exemptions enumerated in the text of rule lOb-6.
THE CONCEPT OF A DISTRIBUTION
The term distribution as used in the Securities Act has been
defined for some purposes. Rule 154,42 promulgated under section
4 (4)43 of that act, was intended to facilitate the determination of
whether the magnitude of a particular securities transaction is such
that registrants should be required to make full and adequate dis-
closure of all relevant information. 44 The criterion under rule 154
for evaluating the size of the offering is whether the block of securi-
chasing during a distribution will also violate 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964) if the
manipulator fails to disclose that the market is not completely competitive because of
his intervention. See, e.g., J. H. Goddard, supra; C. A. Benson & Co., SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 7044 (March 26, 1963); MacRobbins & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release
No. 6846 (July 11, 1962); Sterling Securities Co., 39 S.E.C. 487, 492 (1959). 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15cL-8 (1964) prohibits a broker-dealer in the over-the-counter market from
representing to customers that he is offering a security "at the market" when he does not
have "reasonable grounds to believe that a market for such security exists other than
that made, created, or controlled by him .... " See, e.g., SEC v. Electronics Security
Corp., 217 F. Supp. 831, 836-37 (D. Minn. 1963); Woods & Co., SEC Exchange Act
Release No. 7178 (November 29, 1963). See generally 3 Loss 1480-81. Also, if a
broker-dealer attempts a Regulation A offering, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.601-.610 (a) (1964),
which exempts from registration certain offerings the aggregate price of which does
not exceed 300,000 dollars, he may be found to have violated the provisions of that
regulation if his manipulation has raised the price at which part of the distribution
is sold in such a manner that the aggregate price of the offering actually exceeds the
statutory limitation. See C. A. Benson & Co., supra; Lewisohn Copper Corp., 38 S.E.C.
226 (1958).
2 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (1964, Supp. 1966).
,3 48 Stat. 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (4) (1964).
"See generally 1 Loss 697-708; Delaney, The Whys and Wherefores of Investment
Letters, 30 Fop.vAms L. Rav. 267-70, 278-79 (1961); Gilchrist & Hanna, Secondary Dis-
tribution of Corporate Securities, 13 Sw. L.J. 1, 2-8, 15-20, 27-32 (1959); Note, Distribu-
tion of Exempt Securities Under Section 4(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 16 U.
MAmix L. REy. 319, 326-30 (1961).
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ties is substantial in terms of the total number of shares outstanding
and the aggregate volume of trading in such security. Apart from
this definition and one other minor provision,45 neither the statutory
sections nor the rules include a definition of distribution.
Within a short period after the promulgation of lOb-6, the Com-
mission concluded that while distributions registered under the
Securities Act are certainly within the ambit of the rule, exemption
from registration does not necessarily ensure exemption from the
purview of lOb-6.46 Consequently, the limitations imposed by the
rule were extended to trading in large blocks of securities involved
in less formalized transactions. Precedent has firmly established that
unregistered distributions of large blocks of securities acquired from
an issuer or a person controlling the issuer are subject to the restric-
tions of lOb-6.47 Moreover, the decisions indicate that transactions
involving large blocks of securities need not be accompanied by a
formalized underwriting structure in order to fall within l0b-6.48
Distributions have been found when even an informal syndicate is
lacking,49 andsome rulings have applied the lOb-6 prohibition when
only one broker-dealer was involved in the distribution.0 On the
other hand, it is not uncommon in those cases where more than one
15 Another definition of distribution is found in 17 C.F.R. § 230.140, promulgated
pursuant to the statutory section defining "underwriter." 48 Stat. 75 (1933), 15
U.S.C. § 77b (11) (1964). The rule, the purpose of which is to clarify the status of a
very particularized factual situation, states that when a person's business consists mainly
of buying the securities of any one issuer and disposing of his own securities to supply
proceeds with which to acquire those other securities, that person "is to be regarded as
engaged in the distribution of the securities of such issuer .. " This rule does not
share any meaningful relationship with the definition of distribution developed under
rule lOb-6.
46 See SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Bruns, Nordeman
& Co., 40 S.E.C. 652, 660 (1961); Gob Shops of America, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 92, 103 n.25
(1959); Foshay, supra note 20, at 920.
'17 See, e.g., F. S. Johns & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7972 (October 10,
1966), af'd sub nom. Dlugash d/b/a Douglas Enterprises v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.
1967); J. H. Goddard & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7618 (June 4, 1965); A. T.
Brod & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7139 (September 11, 1963); Sutro Bros.
& Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7053 (April 10, 1963); cf. Woods & Co., SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 7178 (November 29, 1963).
In F. S. Johns & Co., supra, a purchase made by the registrant from an account
of an incorporated brokerage house, the president of which was a controlling person
of the issuer of the securities purchased, was held to be a purchase from a controlling
person of the issuer.
48 See SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Bruns, Nordeman
& Co., 40 S.E.C. 652 (1961).
"' See Sidney Tager, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7368 (July 14, 1964), aff'd, 344
F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965).
60 Batten & Co. v. SEC, 345 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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broker-dealer is involved for a co-participant to be deemed an under-
writer only after an administrative evaluation of all the relevant
facts. 51
The Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission52 revealed that many large firms
did not strictly observe lOb-6 when involved in sales of large blocks
of securities not acquired subject to a formal agreement with the
issuer.5 3  This disregard for the regulatory provisions was especially
prevalent when a broker-dealer was disposing of his inventory posi-
tion in a security through the use of a public market.54 Furthermore,
there is little evidence that pre-10b-6 practice curtailed trading in
similar cases where the transaction was informally executed and did
not involve an unusually large quantity of securities. 55
1 See Sutro Bros. & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7053 (April 10, 1963).
5 H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter cited as Special Study].
The Report of the Special Study is the culmination of the efforts of approximately
sixty-five persons, including lawyers in private practice, personnel from the SEC's own
staff, economists, and professors. Authorized under § 19 (d) of the Exchange Act, the
purpose of the Study was to investigate "the adequacy, for the protection of investors,
of the rules of national securities exchanges and national securities associations .. "
48 Stat. 899, as amended, 75 Stat. 465 (1961), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (d) (1964). While the Study
group worked closely with the Commission, the final recommendations were intended
to represent an independent viewpoint without official approval. See Special Study,
pt. 1, Letter of Transmittal by William L. Cary, Chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission, iv-v; Cary, The Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 62 MICH. L. REv. 557, 560-61 (1964). The final report, con-
taining more than 3,000 pages in six parts, covers a wide range of topics in con-
nection with market transactions, from the qualifications of persons in the securities
industry to the selling practices of open-end investment companies. For a summary
of the Commission's response to the report submitted by the Study, see SEC Special
Market Study Release No. 25 (April 30, 1963). Summaries of actions actually taken
on the recommendations made in the Special Study are recorded in Cary, supra, at
562-66; Cohen, Recommendations of the Special Study of Security Markets, 53 ILi.. BJ.
284 (1964).
" See Special Study, pt. 1, 542-47, 566, 570. The conclusion to be drawn from the
Report of the Special Study and the authorities cited in notes 46-47 supra is that the
source of securities sold is of minimal importance in determining the applicability of
the rule. The source may, however, have significance in the actual proceeding against
a broker-dealer. For example, if the securities are purchased from an issuer, the Com-
mission may arm itself with the additional prohibition against selling unregistered
securities contained in § 5 of the Securities Act. A finding of a violation under this
section would require that the broker-dealer fall within the definition of underwriter
contained in § 2 (11) of the Securities Act. The definition in that section provides that
"any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an
issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security . . ." shall be deemed an
underwriter. See Sutro Bros. & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7053, at 7-8
(April 10, 1963). See also C. A. Benson & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7044
(March 26, 1963).
S" pecial Study, pt. 1, 547.
rr See Letter From Philip A. Loomis, Jr., O'Melveny & Myers, to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, June 11, 1954.
VCol. 1967: 809] RULE 10b-6
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Because neither prior practice nor post-1955 rulings have clarified
the circumstances under which the rule's prohibition applies, it is
here that the need for a more exacting analysis of the components of
the lOb-6 distribution concept is most pressing. The Special Study
recognized the confusion and called for a "clarification by the Com-
mission of the intended impact of the rule . . . ."5 The SEC re-
sponded: "We agree... that the Commission should take appropri-
ate steps to clarify the application of Rule 10 (b) (6) and shall take the
necessary action." 57 Nevertheless, apart from routine issues decided
in later Commission proceedings, no definitive analysis has been made
of the applicability of the term to the various possible situations in
which a broker-dealer or issuer might dispose of a significant position
in a particular security.
"Major selling effort." The most probing administrative and
judicial interpretations of the meaning of distribution, which are
still pre-Special Study decisions, have presented only broad outlines
for the term's application. Gob Shops of America, Inc."' involved a
Regulation A offering59 in which the distributing broker-dealer
placed progressively higher bids in the National Daily Quotation
Sheets despite the fact that he retained a long position in the security.
In determining that a distribution as contemplated by rule lOb-6
need not be an offering registered under the Securities Act, the SEC
concluded that "it is enough if the broker or dealer is engaged in a
distribution in the sense of a major selling effort in his own behalf."00
Unfortunately, this 1959 ruling did not include a definitive break-
down of the elements of the "major selling effort" concept.
Probably because the rule 15411 definition of distribution focuses
on the number of shares of one issuer sold relative to the total num-
ber outstanding, the criterion proffered in Gob Shops was thought to
imply that the number of shares sold by a particular broker-dealer
must be appreciable in terms of the total number outstanding.0 2
However, in 1960, the Commission made clear its position that
"major selling effort" was to be evaluated in terms of the particular
30 Special Study, pt. 1, 547.
57 SEC Special Study Release No. 25 (April 30, 1963).
,8 39 S.E.C. 92 (1959).
"See note 41 supra.60 39 S.E.C. at 103 n.25. (Emphasis added.)
61 See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
"2 See Whitney, supra note 34, at 582-83.
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broker-dealer's activity in the security. In Scott Taylor & Co.,
counsel for one of the broker-dealers involved argued that no "major
selling effort" could be found since his client handled less than one-
half of one per cent of the outstanding shares of the distributed
security.63 The Hearing Examiner, whose findings were approved
by the Commission,64 rejected this contention and found that the
number of shares sold, which represented "an aggregate cash ex-
penditure by the public in excess of $150,000 in a period of less than
four months' time," was substantial in light of the broker-dealer's
normal volume.65
Functional approach. In Bruns, Nordeman & Co.,66 a case factu-
ally identical to Gob Shops, the Commission, premising its interpreta-
tion upon the notion that distribution is to be defined in terms of
the purpose of lOb-6, reasoned that the rule should apply whenever
an offering is of such significance that the distributor's open mar-
ket purchasing must be prevented in order to ensure that the
market price is ascertained by independent, competitive purchasing.6 7
Taken alone, this definition seems only to confirm the term's lack of
definitude. However, the Commission, in attempting to distinguish
a distribution from normal trading activity, established two criteria
by which to evaluate a particular offering: the magnitude of the
block to be marketed68 and the selling efforts and methods employed.
Yet it is not clear from the Commission's analysis what type of selling
efforts and methods not normally undertaken can be pursued by a
broker-dealer without his having to conform to lOb-6 restrictions. 69
03 See Recommended Decision of Hearing Examiner, p. 25, August 15, 1960, in Scott
Taylor & Co. (reported with Theodore A. Landau d/b/a Landau Co.), 40 S.E.C. 1119
(1960).
"4 See 40 S.E.C. at 1125.
Or See Recommended Decision of Hearing Examiner, p. 26, August 15, 1960, in Scott
Taylor & Co. (reported with Theodore A. Landau d/b/a Landau Co.), 40 S.E.C. 1119
(1960).
6 40 S.E.C. 652 (1961).
07 Id. at 660.
08 Ibid.
By implication the term magnitude refers to a block larger than that involved in
normal trading activity. On this basis, it might be argued that the Commission intended
to make the existence of a distribution depend upon a particular broker-dealer's
average trading volume in a security. Later cases, however, do not develop this
approach. For example, no indication has been given as to the period over which
an average should be ascertained. Consequently, a broker-dealer can anticipate
difficulty predicting whether a particular block would have sufficient magnitude to
qualify as a distribution.
00 In Bruns, Nordeman the Commission did give a limited indication of the type of
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The merit of this functional approach lies in the flexibility with
which the Commission can enforce the rule. The prohibition may
be extended to activities which impair the maintenance of a com-
petitive market but which may not have been specifically proscribed
by the letter of the regulation. The generally stated interpretation
equips the Commission for comprehensive policing of the particu-
larly troublesome area of distributions. Within the gamut of possible
securities transactions, it is here that the profit motive will most
likely tempt an artificial intervention into the public market70
Furthermore, the lack of definitional precision facilitates considera-
tion of potentially manipulative practices with reference to the cir-
cumstances of the particular trader involved: the broker-dealer with a
large normal trading volume can be brought within the rule's limita-
tions as well as one who has had little market experience with the
security apart from the large block to which application of 1Ob-6 is
questioned. Finally, any interpretation which proposed exactitude
in the scope of the concept of distribution might encourage schemes
designed to avoid the prohibition of the rule.
Nevertheless, the functional analysis presented in Bruns, Norde-
man, while ensuring flexibility in enforcement, offers little to assist
the broker-dealer in determining the applicability of the rule when
the block to be traded is abnormal in terms of his usual position in
the security but not sufficiently significant to require that a registra-
tion statement be filed."1 The logical alternative to a general defini-
tion is, of course, one which attempts to designate specifically the cri-
selling effort it felt was relevant to a consideration of the applicability of lOb-6 when,
on the particular facts of that case, a finding was made that the registrant had engaged
in a continuous selling effort. 40 S.E.C. at 660. Other factors which have been con-
sidered in evaluating the type of selling effort include whether extra commissions have
been paid to salesmen effecting transactions in a particular security, see Special Study,
pt. 2, 584; 3 Loss 1597; whether the broker-dealer has recommended the security to his
customers in a market letter, see J. H. Goddard & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No.
7618 (June 4, 1965); and whether purchases have been solicited from persons not
previously customers of the broker-dealer, F. S. Johns & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release
No. 7972 (October 10, 1966), aff'd sub nom. Dlugash d/b/a Douglas Enterprises, 373
F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967).
?O See Bruns, Nordeman & Co., 40 S.E.C. 652, 660 n.11 (1961).
The underwriting broker-dealer is, of course, interested in maximizing the profit-
ability of his efforts. Further, even if the underwriting syndicate has purchased the
entire issue and has, therefore, insured that the issuer will receive the funds sought
in this offering, the issuer has an interest in the market reception of his issue; for the
success of its dispersion will affect the willingness of underwriters to assume the risk
of a future distribution.
71 See Special Study, pt. 1, 545-47, 566-70; Whitney, supra note 34, at 586-87.
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teria for a lOb-6 distribution. Since the initial proposal of the rule,
recommendations have been made which incorporate more precise
limits for the distribution concept. One of the letters submitted in
1954 called for a definition in terms of the specific dollar amount to be
realized from the offering of the security.72 It was further submitted
that deference should be given the rule 154 definition of distri-
bution7 3 and its attempts to reach a clear standard by comparing the
size of the block involved with the number of outstanding shares of
the same class and issuer.7 4 The Special Study reported the recom-
mendation of a large member firm of the New York Stock Exchange
that "the definition should be precise as to the size of the offering,
number of shares, etc., and not phrased in general terms."7 5  Pre-
sumably, as a consequence of rejecting the functional definition in
favor of a more precise formulation, broker-dealers could identify
with more certainty those acts which violate rule lOb-6. Those
manipulative activities which now fall within the rule's prohibition
but which would not be encompassed by a more precise redefinition
could be prosecuted under other antimanipulation provisions.7
72 Letter From Philip A. Loomis, Jr., O'Melveny & Myers, to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, June 11, 1954.
73 See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
74 The standards under rule 154 for ascertaining whether a registration statement
need be filed compare the number of securities proposed to be sold to the total number
of the same class outstanding for the same issuer. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (b). On the
other hand, the presence of a "major selling effort" or distribution for lOb-6 purposes is
determined on the basis of the broker-dealer's normal position in the particular security.
See notes 61-65 supra and accompanying text. Therefore, any adaptation of the rule 154
standards for determining the applicability of rule lOb-6 would necessitate a fundamental
alteration in Commissign policy. As a consequence of such a policy change, many
transactions currently treated as within the purview of the rule would be excluded
since the percentage of shares involved would not exceed the minimum presented in
rule 154. See, e.g., SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Further, since rule 154 was promulgated to insure adequate disclosure of information
necessary for a discriminate investment decision and since the adoption of rule lOb-6
does not reveal a similar purpose, the choice of the standards presented by the
former does not appear to be logically compelled. Arguably, the occurrence of cases
where a relatively small percentage of the total outstanding shares of a particular
class are involved (see, e.g., ibid.) would suggest that rule 154 standards may be in-
adequate for effective lOb-6 enforcement. But see note 76 infra and accompanying
text. Also relevant to an evaluation of the acceptability of rule 154 criteria is the
conclusion of a former member of the Securities and Exchange Commission that "it
would be surprising if the industry would, as the price of certainty of application of
Rule lOb-6, agree that the latter rule should take on the 'strait jacket' character-
istics of Rule 154." Whitney, Rule 10b-6: The Special Study's Rediscovered Rule, 62
MicH. L. REv. 567, 581 (1964).
5 Special Study, pt. 1, 568.
70 See note 41 supra. It is arguable that use of antimanipulation provisions as a
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The Commission's view. While the SEC has conceded the need
for clarification of the term distribution,77 it is questionable whether
any redefinition the Commission might undertake would significantly
alter the generality of the present standards. This observation is
suggested by the Commission's position in one of the J. H. Goddard
& Co. opinions.78 On a motion to dismiss the proceedings against
it, the registrant argued that because of the lack of definitive guide-
lines as to what constituted a distribution, rule lOb-6 was unconstitu-
tional for vagueness. The Commission refused to question the
legitimacy of the rule because it had been presented no facts against
which to test the allegation. However, the majority added that
previous cases, including Bruns, Nordeman, had presented sufficient
standards by which an experienced securities dealer such as the
registrant could conduct his activities.7 9 Arguably then, much of
the vagueness presented to a layman upon an examination of case
precedent would be eliminated in practice by the professionalism of
broker-dealers.80
supplement to lOb-6 was within the contemplation of the Commission when it stated,
upon the initial adoption of the rule, that lOb-6 was not intended to apply to all
possible manipulative activities which might arise. SEC Exchange Act Release No.
5194 (July 5, 1955), reprinted at 20 Fed. Reg. 5075 (1955); see SEC Exchange Act Release
No. 5040 (May 18, 1954), reprinted at 19 Fed. Reg. 2986 (1954).
77 See text accompanying note 57 supra.
78 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7321 (May 22, 1964).
79 Id. at 5. The Commission further asserted that since proceedings against
broker-dealers are remedial, and not penal, in nature, the standards of certainty re-
quired in criminal proceedings do not apply. Ibid. While this contention has validity
if only legal requirements are considered, it offers little justification for any confusion
which may result from the vagueness of the term distribution. The preferable criteria
would seem to be not what the Commission must show in order to revoke a broker-
dealer's registration, but rather what a practitioner-broker-dealer, issuer, or counsel-
must know in order to effectuate the stated policy of the rule to protect the investing
public.
80The prohibition of the rule, however, extends not only to broker-dealers, but
also to '"the issuer or other person on whose behalf such a distribution is being
made." Rule lOb-6 (a) (2). The expertise of these latter classes, especially small issuers,
is likely to be significantly less than that of the professional broker-dealer; and conse-
quently, the guidelines presented in prior cases would be less meaningful than they
were assumed to be in J. H. Goddard & Co.
Loss states that "in the absence of a definition of 'distribution,' the indicia include the
absolute and relative size of the offering, .the number of proposed offerees, the required
distributive effort, the presence of a selling group, the payment of a special commission
to salesmen, and the degree of a particular broker-dealer's concentration on pushing the
one security." 3 Loss 1597. While the suggested criteria might provide a basis for
analyzing distribution in some situations, Commission interpretations indicate that the
scope of the concept is broader than Loss' evaluation. For example, in SEC v. Scott
Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), a distribution was found when less
than .5% of the total outstanding shares of an issuer were marketed without a selling
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Other types of distributions. Distributions have been found in
situations which have not required an examination of the magnitude
of sales or quality of marketing efforts employed. First, in SEC v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp.,"' the exchange of one corporation's stock
for the securities of another during the course of an acquisition or
merger was held to bear sufficient relation to the type of situation
meant to be governed by lOb-6 policies to justify application of that
rule. Since the number of shares to be exchanged was partially
dependent upon the market price of the stock during certain valua-
tion periods, the SEC successfully prevented interested persons from
interfering with the competitive nature of the market. The distri-
bution necessary to invoke lOb-6 apparently occurred when Georgia-
Pacific shares were dispensed to holders of securities of the acquired
corporation in exchange for their stock.8 2
Another situation distinguishable from the broker-dealer cases
was presented in Pappas v. Moss. 3 Here, the sale of shares to private
investors by corporate directors was deemed a distribution, so that
purchases by insiders were in violation of lOb-6 and served as a basis
for liability to those holding shares prior to the purchases. This
application of 10b-6 to a non-public distribution of securities was
without precedent. 84 Moreover, the application appears to be a mis-
group or special selling commissions. As guidelines for practical application, "the re-
quired distributive effort" and "the degree of a particular broker-dealer's concentra-
tion on pushing the one security" possess the same infirmities inherent in the Bruns,
Nordeman analysis. However, the Loss approach does serve to re-emphasize that
the Commission's analysis does not delineate the term distribution in readily identifiable
components.
8"'64-'66 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91692 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
12 See generally notes 123-38 infra and accompanying text.
11 257 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1966).
"'In light of the fact that violations of lOb-6 generally encompass violations of
lOb-5, see note 41 supra and accompanying text, the desirability of using lOb-6 as a
basis for civil liability is questionable. VThile the scope of the applicability of lob-5
in private litigation has been established by extensive precedent, any interpretation of
rule lOb-6 in a private suit would be made without benefit of prior judicial analysis.
Further, a violation of rule lOb-5 can be found without reliance upon technical terms
such as distribution. Thus, employment of rule lOb-6 instead of lob-5 offers few, if
any, advantages.
The difficulty which a court might have in applying lOb-6 to a private action is
exemplified by Schraufnagel v. Broadwall Sec., Inc., FED. SEC. L. REP. 91827 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). When asked to find that a distribution was being effected by a securities dealer
who had been the sole market for a security and who had sold substantial blocks of
the security, the court refused to reach that conclusion. However, while the court
failed to find a distribution "as that term is used in the rule," it did recognize that the
rule does not define the term. Ibid. The court cited guidelines proposed by Loss,
3 Loss 1597, which are "presumably .. . the indicia" by which "distribution" is to be
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interpretation of the rule. The motivation for promulgation of
10b-6 was a desire to protect the investing public from losses due
to the withdrawal of artificial price supports.8 5 In the Pappas case,
the objection of the shareholders was not that they suffered a loss
through the creation of an artificial market; rather, relief was re-
quested for damage resulting from corporate mismanagement.8"
Further, while a literal reading of 1Ob-6 might not preclude applica-
tion of the prohibition to private transactions, all precedent has
developed in relation to market activity.87 The investors in Pappas
were not required to pay a price determined solely by the give-and-
take of a public market vulnerable to hidden manipulation; rather,
the price and conditions of the sale were negotiated directly with
the issuer.88 Thus, the price-raising bidding and purchasing which
had previously been the bases of lOb-6 violations were not at issue.
The value of the Pappas case lies in its exemplification of the con-
fusion generated by imprecisely defining the term distribution. Even
if some merit is found in the Commission's view that professional
broker-dealers can discern sufficient guidelines for the application of
1Ob-6 from previous cases, recognition must be given to the fact that
others who do not share this daily contact with securities transactions
defined; but neither the Loss analysis nor the court's application of it is supported by
citation to any decisional authority. See ibid.
85 See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 5194 (July 5, 1955), reprinted at 20 Fed. Reg.
5075 (1955).
11 The plaintiffs contended that the defendant members of the board of directors
caused the corporation to issue shares at less than true value and falsely represented
to the shareholders that the private investors required the directors to purchase a por-
tion of the newly issued shares to show their faith in the stability of the corporation.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs requested no relief under rule lOb-6 but rather
based their assertions on the lOb-5 prohibition against making any untrue statement
of a material fact or omitting to state a material fact and on § 16 (b) of the Securities
Exchange Act which allows recovery by shareholders of any profits made by insiders
through misuse of information made available to them by reason of their relationship
to the issuer. See Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Civil Action No. 96-62
filed February 14, 1963, Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1966). Moreover, after
the district judge had submitted his opinion with reference to a lOb-6 violation, both
the plantiffs and defendants objected to the application of that rule. See Memorandum
in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and Supplement the Findings and Decision,
p. 2, and Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Amended Findings, p. 13. While
the district judge did grant some of the alterations in the findings and decision
requested by the plaintiff, he refused to change his position as to the lOb-6 violation.
See Supplemental Opinion by Judge Wortendyke, 257 F. Supp. at 368-69.8TSee, e.g., Theodore A. Landau d/b/a Landau Co., 40 S.E.C. 1119 (1962); Bruns,
Nordeman & Co., 40 S.E.C. 652 (1961).
's The purchasers bought the securities for 6 dollars per share while the prevailing
market price was approximately 10 dollars per share. 257 F. Supp. at 349.
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will occasionally have to evaluate the relevance of the rule to a par-
ticular factual situation."9
ACrIvITIES PROSCRIBED
Actual purchasing. The most obvious violation of rule lOb-6,
which, unlike the other antimanipulation provisions, is addressed
only to bidding and purchasing,90 involves the actual purchase of
the distributed security on a public market.9 During the period
when the rule was given its first decisional tests, the argument was
often made on behalf of the registrant that lOb-6 was directed solely
against those activities which raised the market price and that if
purchases or bids were made merely to maintain a steady market
during the distribution, the rule could not be the basis of any sanc-
tion.92  The SEC rejected this argument, asserting that the prohibi-
tion of the rule was absolute.93 Such an interpretation can be sup-
ported by the observation that the rule specifically provides that price
supporting must be done in conformity with the provisions of rule
lOb-7, 94 which require that potential stabilizing be dosed to pur-
chasers and actual stabilizing be reported to the SEC.
Bidding. The prohibition of the rule extends expressly to
bidding as well as to purchasing. Even before the rule was adopted,
arguments were made that bidding in the National Daily Quotation
Sheets should not be held to be manipulative.95 Some practitioners
felt that since these sheets were distributed only among dealers, the
retail investing public was not influenced by them.9 6  With strong
support from other authorities, 7 the SEC has consistently contended
80 See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
00 See rule lOb-6 (a), note 6 supra.
01 See, e.g., Life Shares Trading Corp., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7211 (Janu-
ary 8, 1964); C. A. Benson & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7044 (March 26,
1963); Bruns, Nordeman & Co., 40 S.E.C. 652 (1961). The prohibition is enforced as
stringently when the purchaser affects the existing market, see, e.g., SEC v. Georgia-
Pacific Corp., '64-'66 CCH Fan. SEc. L. REP. 91692 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), as when he, by
his purchases and bids, creates the only market in the security, see, e.g., Duval Sec.,
Inc., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7655 (July 23, 1965); Theodore A. Landau d/b/a
Landau Co., 40 S.E.C. 1119 (1962).
02 See SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
0 3 Ibid.
-117 C.F.R. § 240.10b-7 (1964). See 10b-6 (a): "Provided, however, That this section
shall not prohibit... (viii) stabilizing transactions not in violation of § 240.10b-7.
95 See Halsey, Stuart & Co., 30 S.E.C. 106, 126 (1949).
00 See Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319, 325 (1941).
07 See 3 Loss 1564-65; Bloomenthal, The Case of the Subtle Motive and the Deli-
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that such bidding does affect the public market insofar as it is in-
dicative of a willingness on the part of professionals to trade in the
security. Further, it can reasonably be assumed that many broker-
dealers recommend a particular security partly upon the basis of
its status on the inside market.98 Since a broker-dealer was not
bound to accept stock offered in response to bids in the inside mar-
ket,99 those who opposed the Commission's view argued that even
if the investing public were influenced by the sheets, such bidding
was not accepted as a reliable guide to investor acceptance of a
security and should not, therefore, carry the same sanctions as those
imposed for manipulative exchange bidding or purchasing. The
premise of this argument is contrary not to any formal enactment
relative to the enforceability of intra-dealer bidding, but rather to
the rules of two organizations which affect all dealers using the sheets.
First, the National Quotation Bureau, Inc., publisher of the sheets,
includes a clause in the subscription contract which prohibits in-
sincere bidding and which allows for termination of the agreement if
an indefinite bid is found.100 Secondly, the National Association of
Security Dealers, in its Rules of Fair Practice, provides that no bid
is to be made unless the broker-dealer is prepared to respond to an
offer if market conditions remain unchanged. 10 1
Through the numerous proceedings in which the submission of
progressively higher bids in the sheets has been an issue, the Com-
mission has developed two interpretations which represent its view
of the relevance of this type of activity. First, it is now well estab-
lished that no offers need be made by other dealers to meet the bid
submitted in order to find a violation of lOb-6.102 Further, a regis-
trant cannot defend by demonstrating that many other legitimately
cate Art-Control and Domination in Over-the-Counter Securities Markets, 1960 DuKE
L.J. 196, 198-99.
Is See, e.g., SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904, 907 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
"The insertion of bids and offers in the sheets would have the effect of creating
an impression of interest and activity and lend support to the price level at which the
stock was being distributed, and thus facilitate further such distribution." Sutro
Bros. & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7053, at 9 n.26 (April 10, 1963).
" See Halsey, Stuart & Co., 30 S.E.C. 106, 126 (1949).
100 See Special Study, pt. 2, 604. See generally id. at 595-609.
20' Section 6, Rules of Fair Practice, NASD MANUAL, D-6 (1966). Also prohibited
is the submission of a bid for less than the normal unit of trading unless a designation
is made on the bid sheet. Policy with Respect to Firmness of Quotations, NASD
MANUAL, G-57 (1966).
102 See Sidney Tager, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7368, at 4 (July 14, 1964), af'd,
344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965).
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motivated dealers also submitted bids at a similar price level.103
This latter argument is often used in support of a contention that
the security, often underpriced, was really thought to be worth the
amount of the bid.10 4 In the majority of cases, however, the regis-
trant against whom the proceedings are directed has so clearly dom-
inated the market in terms of the percentage of bids submitted that
the Commission has had little difficulty discounting the significance
of bidding by other dealers. 10 5
Trading in a similar security. The purchasing of securities which
might affect the marketability of the distributed security is also pro-
scribed. The rule explicitly prohibits trading in any security into
which the security which is the subject of the distribution might be
converted. 0 6 SEC staff policy has long recognized that any enhance-
ment of a junior security tends to make the senior security more
appealing insofar as the prospect of a profitable exchange is a major
consideration in an evaluation of investment return potential. 0 7
In addition, the rule prohibits trading in "any security of the
same class and series."' 08 The assumption behind this regulation is
that, except for first issues, the marketability of a security subject to
distribution is largely dependent upon that issue's previous market
performance. While the application of the trading prohibition is
clear in most cases, some question has been raised as to what factors
will be considered in determining whether senior securities with the
same rate of return are "of the same series." One situation involved
a public utility with several external loan issues outstanding at rates
varying up to five per cent, all of which were not covered by a tax to
100 See Shearson, Hammill & Go., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7743 (November 12,
1965); J. H. Goddard & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7618 (June 4, 1965);
Theodore A. Landau d/b/a Landau Co., 40 S.E.C. 1119 (1962). But see Lum, Inc., SEC
Securities Act Release No. 4850, at 4 (December 21, 1966), in which the Commission
held that bidding by other broker-dealers was a factor which militated against revoca-
tion of a broker-dealer's registration when he was charged with manipulation under
§ 17 (a) of the Securities Act.
10 See Gob Shops of America, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 92, 102 (1959); Halsey, Stuart & Co.,
30 S.E.C. 106, 112 (1949).
10 See, e.g., Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7743 (No-
vember 12, 1965); J. H. Goddard & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7618 (June 4,
1965); Theodore A. Landau d/b/a Landau & Co., 40 S.E.C. 1119 (1962).
100 Rule lOb-6 (b); see note 6 supra.
107 See 3 Loss 1596 & n.121.
100 Rule lOb-6 (a); see note 6 supra.
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which a new debenture would be subjected. 10 9 Prior to the public
bidding to determine the rate of the new issue, a firm requested an
opinion as to which of the old issues it should not bid for or purchase,
since the firm had reason to believe that tax-exempt institutions
holding these securities might wish to dispose of them in favor of
the new issue. The SEC staff advised that while the debentures with
rates of less than five per cent would probably be distinguish-
able from the new offering, the broker-dealer should suspend
trading in the five per cent debentures, for if an identical rate were
established, the staff would consider the new debentures indis-
tinguishable from the outstanding five per cent issue which would
mature only eleven months earlier °. 0  Noticeably absent from the
Commission's consideration was any reference to the fact that the
two issues would be taxed differently to most holders. The inference
to be drawn from this omission is that whether securities are of the
same series depends not so much on whether they are issued simul-
taneously but on whether an investor comparing the internal char-
acteristics of the two might consider the securities to be similarly
desirable.
Unfortunately, if the Commission intends this ad hoc decision
to be indicative of the basis it will employ for future determinations,
it has presented an unrealistic criterion insofar as no consideration
is afforded the external factor of tax consequences. In his evaluation
of the investment potential of the debentures, an investor with even
a minimum of market experience would consider the possibility of
a tax diminution of his return. A preferable test by which the
Commission could have determined whether the securities were "of
the same class and series" would have included a consideration of
whether, in light of all relevant favors, investors would distinguish
the two securities in making an investment decision.
Sales to related and affiliated persons."' When a distributing
109 See Letter From Edward H. Emerson, Special Consultant, Securities and Exchange
Commission, to Sullivan & Cromwell, June 11, 1965, at 1.
"Old. at 2.
"I" Discussions of the applicability of rule l0b-6 to sales to related and affiliated
persons are often overshadowed by consideration of the more difficult question of what
specific types of limitations should be placed upon sales to affiliates. The desirability
of limitations upon sales of this type is most strenuously argued with respect to "hot
issues"--securities particularly attractive in terms of potential growth and investor
demand. See Rotberg, The "Hot Issue," 17 Bus. LAw. 860 (1962). At the heart of the
controversy over the extent to which affiliates should be allowed to participate in dis-
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broker-dealer sells a substantial part of an offering to related or
affiliated persons, 1 2 it might be deemed to have participated in the
purchasing and, consequently, to have violated rule lOb-6. If the
account to which the securities are sold is one in which the broker-
dealer can be deemed to have a beneficial interest, the consequential
tributions of these issues is a feeling that their purchases unjustly reduce the supply
of the security made available to the public. See First California Co., 40 S.E.C. 768,
771-72 (1961).
While neither the NASD nor the SEC has advocated the most extreme position that
affiliates of the distributing broker-dealer can make no purchases of the hot issue, both
organizations have issued interpretations which increase the restrictions on a broker-
dealer's activities when sales are made to such persons. For example, the SEC requires
that the plan of distribution must be disclosed whether the offering necessitates a
prospectus or is pursuant to Regulation A. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 6097
(October 23, 1959). If .the distributor has a preconceived plan which includes sub-
stantial sales to affiliates, this fact must also be disclosed. See R. A. Holman & Co.,
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7770, at 4-5 (December 15, 1965), aff'd, 366 F.2d 446
(2d Cir. 1966); Preferred Securities, Inc., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7198 (De-
cember 13, 1963). The purpose of this disclosure requirement is to alert investors to
the fact that only a limited amount of the offering will be distributed publicly
and to the possibility that the demand for the securities will significantly affect the
market price. Besides this potential failure to make adequate disclosure, a violation
of rule lOb-5 may be found if the offering price were announced at a certain figure
when, in fact, purchases made by the public would be made from securities resold by
affiliates at a higher price. See Batten & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7086
(May 29, 1963), aff'd, 345 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
The NASD Rules of Fair Practice present a more stringent position: sales to affiliates
are absolutely prohibited if the dealer has unfilled orders unless the sales are in
accordance with "normal investment practice" and the amount so allocated is "in-
substantial and not disproportionate" in terms of the broker-dealer's allotment. In-
terpretation with Respect to "Free-Riding and Withholding," NASD MANUAL, G-23, -24
(1966). "Normal investment practice" for .the purpose of this interpretation is defined
to mean the "history of investment in an. account with the member. If such history
discloses a practice of purchasing mainly 'hot issues,' such record would not constitute
a 'normal investment practice' as used in this interpretation. If the account involved
is that of the member, such account must be clearly an investment account as
distinct from a regular inventory trading account." Id. at G-25. See generally L. H.
Rothchild & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7182 (December 3, 1963). The Com-
mission contemplated the adoption of a rule similar to the NASD's, SEC Exchange Act
Release No. 3707 (April 16, 1946), but later decided, consistent with its policy of pro-
moting industry self-regulation, to allow the association to regulate the area. See First
California Co., supra, at 771 nA.
"12 For the purposes of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice, the term "affiliate" means
"any officer, director, partner, employee or agent of the member or of any other mem-
ber or . . . a member of the immediate family of any such person." Interpretation
with Respect to "Free-Riding and Withholding," NASD MANUAL, G-24 (1966). Sales
to persons in most of these classifications would also be scrutinized under the SEC
provisions. See R. A. Holman & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7770 (Decem-
ber 15, 1965), aff'd, 366 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1966) ("immediate family," "dose relatives,"
"secretary for registrant," and "counsel for registrant"); Batten & Co., SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 7086 (May 29, 1963), aff'd, 345 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ("relatives, em-
ployees, and friends").
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violation is specifically covered by lOb-6 (a).113 While available prec-
edent presents no definitive analysis of the beneficial interest con-
cept,114 apparently the basic determination involves consideration of
whether the broker-dealer actually makes the decisions as to when
and at what price securities will be sold from the nominal account.11"
Further, the distributor can be viewed as an aider and abettor to a
lOb-6 violation if he sells part of the offering to an affiliate's account
or to an account of another broker-dealer 116 with the intention that
the purchaser will create an independent market in the security. 1.
In order to sustain a charge of concerted purpose against a non-
distributing broker-dealer, however, the Commission must overcome
an obvious evidentiary difficulty, for there is no prohibition against
an independent dealer buying securities distributed by another mem-
ber of the industry.""' Finally, in the case of a sale to an affiliate,
repurchases by the broker-dealer may give rise to a ruling that the
distribution had not been completed until these reacquired shares
had come to rest in the hands of the public."19 Thus, the repurchases,
having been made during the course of a distribution, will be in
violation of lOb-6.120
128 See note 6 supra.
I' See generally Duval Securities, Inc., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7655 (July 23,
1965); R. Baruch & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7138 (September 11, 1963),
supplemented by, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7932 (August 9, 1966); Preferred
Securities, Inc., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7198 (December 13, 1963); Best & Garey
Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 6841 (July 6, 1962); Batten & Co., 40 S.E.C. 997
(1962); First California Co., 40 S.E.C. 768 (1961).
Without analyzing the concept of beneficial interest in detail, the Commission held
in Preferred Securities, Inc. that sales to a corporation wholly-owned or fifty per cent-
owned by a distributing broker-dealer may be deemed to be sales to an account in
which he has a beneficial interest. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7198 (December 13,
1963).
116 Cf. Batten & Co., 40 S.E.C. 997 (1962).
1 26 If sales are made to a broker-dealer outside of the distributing firm, the size of
the purchase may be so substantial as to qualify this outside trader as an underwriter
of the distribution. If such a finding were made, the broker-dealer registration of the
undesignated undervriter would be subject to suspension or revocation for his failure
to register with the syndicate. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 6097 (October 23, 1959).
"'7 See Lewisohn Copper Corp., 38 S.E.C. 226 (1958); cf. Hayden Lynch & Co., SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 7935 (August 10, 1966).
1Is See Sidney Tager, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7368, at 5-6 (July 14, 1964),
aff'd, 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965).
119 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 6097 (October 23, 1959); see R. A. Holman & Co.,
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7770 (December 15, 1965), aff'd, 366 F.2d 446 (2d Cir.
1966); Batten & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7086 (May 29, 1963), arf'd, 345
F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
120 Mayo & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7310, at 3 (May 8, 1964).
Emphasis should be given to the Commission's position that sales
to affiliates are not improper per se and that a violation of lOb-6
results only when the distributing broker-dealer is implicated in a
manipulative scheme involving such sales. 1' 1 Similarly, the Com-
mission does not contend that a broker-dealer may never repurchase
from an affiliate's account. Although the Commission has never clear-
ly defined the prohibition period for these repurchases, they certainly
will not be allowed prior to the closing of the distribution 2 2 and
presumably will be prohibited until the market for the security has
become sufficiently independent of the effect of the distribution.
Corporation's purchase of its own securities. The Georgia-Pacific
litigation 2 3 demonstrates the SEC's position that purchases by a
corporation of its own shares must conform to the limitations of
lOb-6. In that case, the defendant company was engaged in acquiring
several other corporations under stock exchange programs. With
regard to some of the acquired firms, the amount of stock which
Georgia-Pacific would have to relinquish was, by the acquisition
agreements, dependent upon the closing market price of Georgia-
Pacific stock during certain valuation periods. In its complaint,
the SEC charged that purchases were made for employee stock bonus
plans and for the accounts of corporate shareholders in a manner
which raised the price of Georgia-Pacific stock "in order that GP's
obligation to issue additional shares . ..would be avoided or re-
duced."' 24 The defendants, including the corporation and three of
its shareholders, two of whom were trustees for the stock bonus trusts,
121 Rather than absolutely prohibiting sales to and repurchases from affiliates, the
SEC has indicated .that it will scrutinize this type of transaction for indications of a
preconceived plan. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 6097 (October 23, 1959). The
use of circumstantial evidence will be a significant factor in the determination that a
preconceived plan for repurchasing existed. For example, in reaching its conclusion
in R. A. Holman & Co. that "a substantial portion of the.. . . offering was sold to in-
siders and 'affiliated' persons with a view to its subsequent repurchase and distribution,"
the Commission considered "the expected public salability of the ... stock, registrant's
short sales, the relationship of the purchasers to registrant or Holman, [and] . . .the
period of retention of the stock by purchasers .... ." SEC Exchange Act Release No.
7770, at 4 (December 15, 1965), aff'd, 366 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1966).
22 See R. A. Holman & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7770, at 4 (Decem-
ber 15, 1965), aff'd, 366 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1966); Advanced Research Associates, Inc.,
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7117, at 20-22 (August 16, 1963).
123 SECv. Georgia-Pacific Corp., '64-'66 CCH Fs.I. SEC. L. REP. 91692 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
124 Excerpts from the Complaint are reprinted id. at 91680. See generally SEC
Litigation Release No. 3496 (April 27, 1966).
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consented to a judgment which outlined the circumstances under
which future purchases were to be made for personal investment, for
the tirust, and for acquisition of treasury shares for future exchanges.
The final order established that when the defendant corporation
begins serious negotiations looking toward acquisition of another
firm, the latter must be advised of any market activity by Georgia-
Pacific, its stock plan, or the noncorporate defendants in the previous
thirty days.' 25 The company is required to elicit similar information
from all of its officers, directors, and holders of more than ten per
cent of its shares. Further, the defendants are absolutely prohibited
from bidding and purchasing 126 while the corporation is distributing
securities or during the period when the terms of an acquisition
agreement with another firm are being finally established. 127  With
respect to all other times, limitations are placed upon the volume
acquisitions and the conditions under which shares can be purchased.
The restrictions imposed upon purchases by the acquiring corpo-
ration and its major shareholders seem to be justified insofar as
the interest of these groups in the success of the exchange or distribu-
tion could motivate a manipulative intervention into the market.
Prior practice is consistent with this limitation, for lOb-6 specifically
proscribes purchases by issuers, and staff policy has included officers,
directors, and controlling persons within this concept. 128 Moreover,
the limitations upon purchases by the corporation for the acquisition
of treasury shares to be used in an exchange would appear to temper
the adverse effect which such a concentration of demand would have
upon the market.
The SEC's position concerning the applicability of 1Ob-6 to pur-
chases for employee stock plans is less clear than that taken in relation
to purchases for the accounts of the corporation and its officers and
directors. In previous instances, the Commission has required that
purchases by such a plan cease when a distribution is actually in
125 See '64-'66 CCH Fa. SEc. L. REP. 91692. See generally SEC Litigation Release
No. 8511 (May 23, 1966).
12' While the defendants who were trustees for the Stock Bonus Trust were pro-
hibited from purchasing securities for the trust, provision was made in the final
judgment for appointment of an independent corporate fiduciary who would be allowed
to continue purchasing during distributions and exchanges. See text accompanying note
132 infra.
127 '64-'66 CCH FFD. SEc. L. REP. 91692.
128 See 3 Loss 1599 n.133; Foshay, Market Activities of Participants in Securities
Distributions, 45 VA. L. REv. 907, 935 (1959).
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progress.129 This position is most likely to be taken when the person
in charge of the plan is also in some position of control within the
corporation.180  On the other hand, the SEC staff has stated that
it will not place limitations upon the-purchases of an employee stock
plan where administration of the plan is guided by an independent
trustee "who has full discretion as to time and price" of purchases.' 3'
However, in the Georgia-Pacific case, the final judgment provided
that future purchases for the plan were to be made under a unique
arrangement. The original trustees of the Georgia-Pacific plan, who
were not independent of the control of the corporation, were re-
tained but prohibited from purchasing for the plan except through
an independent corporate fiduciary. While the independent agent
was allowed to make purchases irrespective of the occurrence of an
exchange or distribution, he was permitted to place orders with only
one broker per day and to purchase only ten per cent of the'average
weekly trading volume in specified Georgia-Pacific securities. No
bid or purchase was to be made at the opening of the exchange or
within one hour of its closing or at a price in excess of that currently
prevailing,82
One consideration which militates against imposition of any
129 Foshay, supra note 128, at 934-37.
Foshay notes at least three situations in which purchases were to be discontinued
by the employee stock plans of companies which were involved in distribution. How-
ever, except in one instance, no limitations were placed upon the plans during non-
distribution periods. Also, Foshay indicates that purchases by stock plans were.-not
curtailed when the distribution originated from a foundation connected with the issuer;
Since the stock plans of General Motors and Ford Motor Company were not prohibited
from trading while the Sloan and Ford Foundations respectively were undertaking to
dispose of large holdings of securities, Foshay concludes that the foundations were
viewed as entities separate and distinct from the corporation. Id. at 935.
110 The Genesco, Inc. Prospectus of May 10, 1966, outlines limitations which that
corporation voluntary imposed upon purchases by its employee stock plans after warn-
ings by the SEC. The limitations imposed are similar .to those enforced in the Georgia-
Pacific litigation. See '64'66 CCH FR. SEC. L. REP. 77354; note 132 infra and accom-
panying text. As in Georgia-Pacific, purchases for the plans were made by persons
who were in a position to exercise control over the corporations. The chairman of
the board of directors of Genesco, Inc. was the trustee under two employee stock
purchase plans. Other officers and directors of the corporation were the trustees of a
third plan.
181See Memorandum to Clients by Sullivan & Cromwell, p. 13, May 12, 1966.
Apparently, the staff had not always granted full discretion to independent trustees, for
in 1959 when the Ford Foundation undertook a secondary offering of common stock
of the Ford Motor Company, the independent trustee for the Company's stock plan
was subjected to limitations upon its volume of purchases and methods of acquisition.
However, the prohibition was not absolute. See Foshay, supra note 128, at 935-36,
132 See '64-'66 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91692.
Vol. 1967: 809] RULE 10b-6
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
limitation upon purchases by an employee stock plan is the possi-
bility that the employees will be deprived of the full benefit of the
program. 3 3 Restrictions on purchasing are especially difficult to
justify in relation to plans which dispense acquired securities directly
to employees, for the extent to which employees holding small
amounts of their employer's securities would be motivated to upset
the competitive nature of the market is minimal. Further, if the
SEC continues to prohibit some plans from purchasing when a dis-
tribution is in progress, several difficulties will arise. If the plan
has been making regular purchases of an appreciable number of
shares, 34 withdrawal of this demand would tend to accentuate the
oversupply of the market which characteristically occurs in many dis-
tributions. If because of the oversupply the financing of the corpo-
ration were impaired, assuming the distribution is made on behalf
of the issuer, the stock plan would have adversely affected the in-
terests of the corporation as well as the participating employees.
Also, when a distribution in the sense of a major selling effort by a
broker-dealer is undertaken, those in charge of the stock plan are
likely to be unaware of its occurrence. Imposition of sanctions for
purchases made during this period would be unjust without the
SEC's requiring that improved publicity be given these secondary
distributions. 135 Where the individual directing the plan is also in
'-" See Foshay, supra note 128, at 933.
To relate the volume of allowable purchases by a stock plan to the volume of trading
by all investors, as was done in the Georgia-Pacific and Genesco situations, is to
assume that the degree of employee interest in the employer's securities bears a direct
relationship to the interest which members of the general investing public have in the
stock. Such an assumption is questionable since the basis of motivation for purchasing
stock in a company may differ between employees and other investors. For example,
the latter group probably pays much attention to the potential of the general industry
in which the employer's firm functions while the former group will consider mainly
the operation of the particular plant. Consequently, if in a particular period employee
interest in the employer's security is at a high level, a low interest among outside in-
vestors will prevent complete satisfaction of any desire employees might have to
purchase the security.
1.3 Foshay notes that, in 1954, purchases for General Motors' stock plan represented
approximately 16% of all G.M. shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange. The
trustee of the Ford stock plan made purchases representing 18% of the total exchange
trading volume in Ford stock in 1956; for 1957 and 1958, the trustee bought 21% and
19% respectively of the total trading volume. Foshay, supra note 128, at 934, 936.
185 The inference to be drawn from the current policies behind regulation of un-
registered secondary distributions is that application of lOb-6 to these situations is
intended only to curb the market activities of broker-dealers. No indication has been
given that an issuer will be prosecuted for an inadvertent bid or purchase during such
an offering. Yet, since such purchases would be prohibited under a literal application
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some position of control with respect to the company, however, the
possibility of manipulative purchases is clear, and the prohibition on
purchasing can logically be extended to encompass the market activi-
ties of this type of director. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that
the employee-beneficiaries receive the full benefit of the program
and that no additional market over-supply occurs, the Commission
could exempt all employee plans from the prohibitions of lOb-6,
including those directed by a controlling person, and attack any
attempted manipulation with other provisions of the 1933 and 1934
Acts.136
While some support can be found for the SEC's attitude to-
ward employee stock plans directed by a controlling person, the
restrictions imposed by the consent judgment in the Georgia-Pacific
litigation seem less justifiable. Basically, insufficient consideration
has been afforded the independent nature of the corporate fiduciary
to be appointed by the trustees of the plan. It is difficult to reconcile
the lack of discretion accorded this agent with the staff's statement
that no limitations will be imposed upon a trustee independent of
the control of the company. If a fiduciary is truly independent, a
conceptual difficulty arises when his purchases are included under
the prohibition on trading by issuers. Further, if the appointee is
not related to the management functions of Georgia-Pacific, his status
seems to be similar to that of any customer with a substantial invest-
ment portfolio. Placing a ceiling upon the volume of purchases by
such an investor is without convincing precedent. 13 7
In general, what is needed is a complete clarification by the SEC
of its present position with regard to purchases by an employee stock
plan during a distribution or negotiations for an exchange. This
is not to suggest that one simple rule might be suitable in all cases.
Any pronouncement would necessarily have to consider the myriad
forms which a stock plan might take. Nonetheless, basic discrepancies
such as those relating to the discretion to be exercised by an in-
dependent trustee and the role of the controlling person as director
of a plan could be resolved. Also, guidelines should be established
for stock plans which purchase securities not traded on a national
of .the rule, a statement from the SEC as to the precise status of purchases of this type
would be appropriate.
230 See note 9 supra.
'17 But see note 134 supra.
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exchange. Since the Georgia-Pacific limitations relate mainly to
purchases on an exchange, most of them are not adaptable to the
over-the-counter market in which no record is kept of the volume of
shares traded and neither opening nor closing bids are entered.
Consequently, instead of adopting a limitation phrased in terms of
a percentage of trading volume, the permissible volume would need
to be expressed as an absolute number of shares. Presumably re.
tained in principle would be restrictions such as the requirement
that purchases be made through only one broker and that no bids or
purchases be made so as to create actual or apparent active trading.1 18
THOSE TO WHOM RULE 10B-6 APPLIES
Statutory classifications. Prior to 1Ob-6, SEC policy apparently
restricted the market activities of the syndicate manager more than
those of the other members of the underwriting group. 139 In its
current form, however, the rule does not distinguish between these
two groups, but rather uses the term underwriter to encompass
both.140  Rule IOb-6 (c) (1) defines underwriter in terms of a relation-
ship directly with an "issuer or other person on whose behalf such
a distribution is made."'14' While the rule contemplates that the
relationship be represented by an agreement, judicial interpretation
establishes that even an extremely informal arrangement will suffice.
For example, in Shearson, Hammill & Co., 42 a dealer's relationship
with an issuer qualified under the rule despite the fact that no under-
188 See Memorandum to Clients by Sullivan & Cromwell, pp. 7-8, May 12, 1966.
189 See 3 Loss 1595. Generally, the manager was to withdraw from trading earlier
than the other underwriters.
"9 "Prospective underwriters" must conform to the same restrictions as under-
writers. See rile lOb-6 (a) (1). A member of the former group is one who has "agreed
to submit or has submitted a bid to become an underwriter" or "who has reached
an understanding,- with the issuer. . that he will become an underwriter." Rule
lOb-6 (c) (2).
I1 Rule lOb-6 (a) (2).
Section 2 (11) of the Securities Act, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (b) (11)
(1964), also defines "underwriter," but for the purpose of determining whether particu-
lar securities -should be registered to ensure that proper disclosure of relevant informa-
tion -is made to investors. This definition is more narrow than that found in lOb-6 (c),
since the former contemplates an actual agreement with the issuer, while for lOb-6
purposes on6 has merely to submit a bid to underwrite an offering to come within
the prohibition of the rule. Nonetheless, § 2(11) has been employed in determining
whethe 1 I particular broker-dealer's activities fall within the prohibition of rule
10b-6. See R. Baruch & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7932 (August 9, 1966);
Sutro Bros. & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7053, at 7 (April 10, 1963).
142 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7743 (November 12, 1965).
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writing fee was paid and the New York office of the firm had refused
to underwrite the issue.'43 In another case, it was held that the
registrant should have inquired ifito the ownership of the stock he
sold and the circumstances of its acquisition;144 a failure to do so
when relevant facts would have prompted an investigation by a
reasonable man may lead to the revocation of a broker-dealer's regis-
tration. 45 Furthermore, the liability of an underwriter may be
indirect even if his relationship with the issuer is formal, for the
SEC has determined that, as a matter of law, all the members of an
underwriting syndicate are liable if the managing underwriter, who
acts as agent for the others, effects unlawful transactions 46
As stated above,' 47 the lOb-6 prohibition applies to the "issuer or
other person on whose behalf, [the] ... distribution is being made."
Shortly after promulgation of the rule, a proposal was made to amend
lOb-6 (a) (2) to make it clear that officers and directors were included
within the prohibition.14  Though the wording of this announce-
ment was interpreted to mean that staff policy had always assumed
these classes were included, 149 the proposed amendment was with-
drawn nine years later.50 Even without a formal provision, how-
ever, the SEC has continued to extend the prohibition to these classes
with apparent acceptance by the courts.15'
The final category of those prohibited from bidding and pur-
chasing during the course of a distribution include "a broker, dealer,
or other person who has agreed to participate or is participating in
143 Id. at 3-7. In Shearson, Hammill 6 Co., a few staff members of one of registrant's
branch offices undertook to promote sales of securities of an issuer without any formal
underwriting agreement with the latter. Similarly, in Lum's, Inc., SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4850, at 7 (December 21, 1966), the broker-dealer argued that "it had not
entered into any agreement and had no obligation to sell [its client's securities] . . f
and that "it received no special underwriter's fees, commissions or compensation in con-
nection with [the sales it made]." The Commission was persuaded by neither of these
arguments and concluded that "for the purpose of Rule lOb-6 the lack of an express
arrangement characterized as an underwriting agreement is not controlling." Id. at 8.
2 Sutro Bros. & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7053, at 10 (April 10, 1963).
14 See ibid.
' See Opinion of Director of the Trading and Exchange Division, SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 3505 (November 16, 1943).
11 See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
I18 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 5415 (December 5, 1956).
219 See 3 Loss 1599 n.133. But see Foshay, supra note 128, at 926.
1110 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7517 (January 22, 1965).
'" See SEC v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., '64-'66 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91692 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). 1-1 1
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such a distribution. 152  Decisions interpreting the scope of this
phrase have required that an evaluation of the circumstantial evi-
dence indicate that an individual "must have known" that the securi-
ties with which he dealt were the subject of a distribution. In the
usual case a broker-dealer is found either to have assisted an issuer
directly in disposing of an unregistered offering158 or, more fre-
quently, to have lent support to the efforts of a distributing broker-
dealer. 54 It must be emphasized, however, that not all broker-
dealers are prohibited from buying a security which is the subject of
a distribution. 55 Rather, the primary issue is whether the dealer
in question and the issuer or actual distributor are so closely involved
that the affiliate is promoting the latter's efforts to market a security.
To sustain a finding that the trader probably was or should have
been aware of the special nature of the security he bid for or pur-
chased, the Commission will generally determine one or more of the
following: (1) the broker-dealer knew that the security had been the
subject of a distribution during a recent period;5 6 (2) the broker-
dealer had been asked to place bids on behalf of an issuer or dis-
tributor whom the former knew held a long position in the se-
curity; 57 (3) the relationship between the broker-dealer and the
distributor or issuer had been so close that the former's denial of
knowledge is unreasonable; 58 (4) the broker-dealer was aware that
quotations in the bid sheets were advancing significantly despite the
absence of any demand for the security; 159 (5) in the case of a security
152 Rule lOb-6 (a) (3). Members of the underwriting group are also broker-dealers,
but apparently in order to encompass members of the selling group within the rule's
prohibition, clause (a) (3) designates broker-dealers as a class distinct from underwriters.
153 See R. Baruch & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7138 (September 11, 1963),
supplemented by, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7932 (August 9, 1966); Sutro Bros. &
Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7053 (April 10, 1963).
Ir' See, e.g., F. S. Johns & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7972 (October 10,
1966), aff'd sub nom. Dlugash d/b/a Douglas Enterprises v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.
1967); Sidney Tager, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7368 (July 14, 1964), aff'd, 344
F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965); Theodore A. Landau d/b/a Landau Co., 40 S.E.C. 1119 (1962).
: See Sidney Tager, supra note 154.
1'56 See R. Baruch & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7932, at 4 (August 9, 1966);
Sidney Tager, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7368, at 5 (July 14, 1964), afJ'd, 344 F.2d
5 (2d Cir. 1965).
'G See F. S. Johns & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7972 (October 10, 1966),
af'd sub nom. Dlugash d/b/a Douglas Enterprises v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967).
158 See Theodore A. Landau d/b/a Landau Co., 40 S.E.C. 1119 (1962).
159 See F. S. Johns & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7972 (October 10, 1966),
aff'd sub nor. Dlugash d/b/a Douglas Enterprises v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.
1967).
the price of which had been substantially increased by manipulative
activity, the broker-dealer had previously dealt with the stock at a
lower price.160 In defense of a charge that he should have been cog-
nizant that particular securities were subject to lOb-6 restrictions,
the broker-dealer is not assisted by the fact that he received assurances
from the primary distributor that the stock was free to trade if it is
found that, under the circumstances, the registrant should have taken
"reasonable precautions to satisfy [himself] that the distribution was
over."' 61
The implications of a finding that an individual must have
known of another's activities are especially significant in the relation-
ship between a broker-dealer and the salesmen he employs. For
example, a suspension or revocation of a broker-dealer's registration
may result from his failure to investigate and correct unusual and
questionable circumstances surrounding the activities of his em-
ployees. 16 2 Management is responsible for correctly interpreting
"warning signals" and for taking appropriate action to rectify em-
ployee shortcomings.1 3  While the Commission has never under-
200 See Theodore A. Landau d/b/a Landau Co., 40 S.E.C. 1119, 1124 (1962).
161 Sidney Tager, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7368, at 5 (July 14, 1964), aff'd,
344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965).
102 Broker-dealers are charged with the responsibility for supervising all activities of
their employees and not merely those which would violate lOb-6. See Special Study,
pt. 1, 290-91. This obligation, developed through Commission rulings, has now been
proposed in regulatory form to apply to broker-dealers who market over-the-counter
but who are not members of the NASD. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7984
(October 25, 1966). Those who are members of the NASD apparently must observe
similar standards. See Reuben Rose & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7964
(September 29, 1966). In Reynolds & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 6273, at
14-15 (May 25, 1960), the SEC outlined its position as follows: "[Where the failure of
a securities firm and its responsible personnel to maintain and diligently enforce a
proper system of supervision and internal control results in the perpetuation of fraud
upon customers or in other misconduct in willful violation of the Securities Act or the
Exchange Act, for purposes of applying the sanctions provided under the securities
laws such failure constitutes participation in such misconduct, and willful violations
are committed not only by the person who performed the misconduct but also by
those who did not properly perform their duty to prevent it."
101 See Kamen & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7965 (September 29, 1966);
Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 25-30 (November 12,
1965); cf. Foshay, supra note 128, at 911; Reuben Rose & Co., SEC Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 7964 (September 29, 1966).
In one case, the SEC implied that the employer's liability for violation by employees
was absolute and not dependent upon a finding of inadequate supervision. Sutro Bros.
& Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7053 (April 10, 1963). The Commission stated:
"Registrant as a firm can only act through its employees and agents, and the willful
violations of its employees in the course of their employment must be considered the
willful violations of the firm." Id. at 9.
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taken to define the precise nature of these signals, an employer pre-
sumably should watch for activities such as large volume transactions
by his salesmen, excessive activity in one security by an employee
when the brokerage firm is not conducting a formalized selling cam-
paign in that security, and unusually close dealing between the sales-
man and a customer with large holdings in particular securities.,
Of course, the salesman is held to knowledge of the distributions
which his firm undertakes. 6 5 While an offering is being made, the
salesman is prohibited from trading even if he is not actively engaged
in the firm's efforts to distribute the security.6 6 One foreseeable
problem area could develop when a broker-dealer with a large sales
force is undertaking an unregistered distribution in the sense of a
"major selling effort." Special care must necessarily be exercised to
ensure that all salesmen are informed of such an undertaking, so
that bidding and purchasing are brought into conformity with the
limitations of rule lOb-6.
Indirect participants. Even if he has not made purchases or
placed bids himself, an individual may be found to have violated
the rule. The most frequently litigated example of indirect pur-
chasing involves a distributor who has another broker-dealer enter
bids for him. 6 7 As has been noted in relation to other aspects of
lOb-6 enforcement, the failure to find a formal agreement or active
collusion does not prevent imposition of sanctions by the SEC. 0 8
Furthermore, the party who actually enters the bid may be found to
be guilty as a principal for aiding and abetting a lOb-6 violation even
though :he is not directly or formally involved in the distribution of
the security.169 Frequently, it is in this situation that the Commis-
1 Cf. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7984 (October 25, 1966).
163 See R. Baruch & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7932, at 3-5 (August 9,
1966).
266 Seepinion of the Director of the Trading and Exchange Division, SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 3505 (November 16, 1943).
167 See; e.g., SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); F. S. Johns
& Co., SECExchange Act Release No. 7972 (October 10, 1966), aflf'd sub nom. Dlugash
d/b/a Douglas Enterprises v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967); Sidney Tager, SEC Ex-
change Act Release No. 7368 (July 14, 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965); R. laruch
& Co.; SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7138 (September 11, 1963), supplemented by,
SEC E.xchange Act Release No. 7932 (August 9, 1966).
1168 See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
-" 'See R. Baruch & ,Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7932, at 5 (August 9,
1966); Sidney Tager, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7368 (July 14, 1964), aff'd, 344
F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965). The usual sanction imposed as a result of a finding of indirect
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sion concludes, on the basis of circumstantial evidence, that a broker-
dealer "must have known" of the special relationship the other indi-
vidual bore to the securities involved.
Foreign underwriters. Because the jurisidction of the SEC under
rule lOb-6 is limited to transactions involving use of the mails, instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce, or facilities of a national ex-
change,170 many activities in distributions jointly undertaken by
American and foreign underwriters-such as purchasing on a foreign
exchange by a foreign underwriter-do not come within the direct
control of the Commission.:"' Yet, a broker-dealer in the United
States may be found to be an indirect participant in overseas viola-
tions; thus, the Agreement among Underwriters often includes some
trading restrictions similar to those imposed by lOb-6.'7 2 Requests
for such inclusions are made even in the most extreme situation
where the offering is made entirely outside of this country and not
registered under the Securities Act. 73 However, these restrictions
often do not interfere with the normal procedure on many foreign
exchanges which allows an underwriter to continue normal trading
activity despite his involvement in the distribution.1 4 Even when
the Agreement among Underwriters does not suspend the trading
participation in the distribution is revocation or suspension of the broker-dealer's
registration.
170 Rule lOb-6 (a); see note 6 supra.
171 See generally WoRmD COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL FINANCING AND
INVEST ENT 452-60 (McDaniels ed. 1964).
Provision was made in the Exchange Act to equip the Commission with the means
to control manipulation on a foreign exchange by a broker-dealer registered in this
country. Section 50(a) of that act provides: "It shall be unlawful for any broker or
dealer, directly or indirectly, to make use of the mails or of any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce for the purpose of effecting on an exchange not within
or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, any transactions in any security the
issuer of which is a resident of, or is organized under the laws of, or has its principal
place of business in, a place within or subject to .the jurisdiction of the United States,
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors or to
prevent the evasion of this title." 48 Stat. 904, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (a) (1964). However,
the Commission has no rules or regulations in force under this title. Consequently,
since the section is not self-operative, it is without current significance in controlling
the activities of a broker-dealer on a foreign exchange.
'17 See Memorandum on Application of SEC Rules l0b-G, 10b-7 and lOb-8 to Foreign
Offerings, February 7, 1966, at 2-3, in the files of Sullivan & Cromwell.178 Id. at 9-10.
17
, In practice, firms in this country frequently request disclosure in the prospectus
if the foreign underwriters are to be allowed to continue their normal trading activities.
Id. at 10-11. The law firm notes that it is desirable to obtain a "no action" letter
from the Commission to ensure that the offering can be made without interruption.
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activity of the foreign underwriters, the Commission has granted
exemptions when such transactions would not cause undue inter-
ference with the distribution?75
PERIOD OF PROHIBITION
Commencement of the prohibition. Rule lOb-6 as finally promul-
gated included an attempt to specify the commencement of the
period during which trading on the market was prohibited.'1 6 Un-
fortunately, the provisions of the rule are presented with varying
degrees of clarity. For example, as to underwriters and prospective
underwriters, the general requirement is that the prohibition must
begin when a broker-dealer attains the status of either of these
groups in relation to a particular distribution.177 Yet, the effect of
this general statement is largely altered by the exemption in lOb-6 (a)
(xi) which permits bids and purchases not involving the use of
facilities of a national exchange to be made up to ten business days
prior to the effective date of the registration statement or, in the case
:175 Cohen 9- Throop, Investment of Private Capital in Foreign Securities, in A
LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINEss TRANSACTIONS 570 (ABA-ALI 1963). "In
considering these requests, the Commission is primarily concerned with the impact of
the market activities abroad on the United States distribution. In attempting to
analyze this impact prior to the commencement of the distribution, all pertinent factors
are considered, including the amount of trading activity in the United States, the
location of the principal markets, the nature of the distribution, the proposed market
activities of United States and European underwriters, and the differences in trading
hours between the United States and foreign markets." Id. at 570-71.
176 Even prior to the first proposal of the rule it was common practice for some
broker-dealers to reduce their trading activities when a distribution was contemplated,
although much of the tapering off was largely a reaction to the uncertainty as to what
constituted excessive trading under then current SEC pronouncements. See 3 Loss
1595; Foshay, supra note 128, at 910-11. See generally Opinion of the Director of the
Trading and Exchange Division, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 3505 (November 16,
1943). The extent of the adjustment varied among traders with primary consideration
given to such factors as the interval between any proposed trading and the offering, the
amount of the particular broker-dealer's interest in the offering, and the volume of
trading contemplated in relation to the size of the offering. See Foshay, supra note
128, at 912, n.18. In general, the managing underwriter began limiting his trading
activity when he learned about his participation in the distribution. Other members
of the syndicate apparently did not limit their trading to any great extent until the
registration statement was filed. See 3 Loss 1595. Whether members of the selling
group curtailed their activities is not clear (see Letter From David V. Stern, Jr.,
Schumacher, Gilmore, Van Ness & Stem, to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
June 18, 1954) though the activity of these individuals was probably regulated by
agreement with the underwriters.
177 The earliest possible commencement of the prohibition occurs when the under-
writing syndicate is chosen by competitive bidding, for here a broker-dealer becomes
an underwriter as soon as he has agreed to submit a bid with a syndicate. Rule
lOb-6 (c) (2); see note 6 supra. But see notes 187-88 infra and accompanying text.
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of an unregistered offering, ten days prior to the commencement of
the distribution. Moreover, between the ninth and fifth business
days, unsolicited purchases are allowed. 178 A broker-dealer who is
connected with the distribution but who is not an underwriter simi-
larly qualifies for the exemption.
Trading prior to the ten-day cushion period must conform to
two practical limitations. First, the extension of trading time allowed
by the exemption is granted only "if none of the purchases or bids
are for the purpose of creating actual, or apparent, active trading or
in raising the price" of the distributed security.'79 By implication,
then, the exemption was meant to preserve the continuity of only
normal trading activity8 0 and not to allow the broker-dealer actively
to facilitate the distribution by injecting an appearance of excessive
demand into the market. Second, the practice of the SEC staff has
been to extend the ten-day period to permit "cooling off" if activity
has been excessive prior to the beginning of the prohibition period.18
With respect to an "issuer or other person on whose behalf such
a distribution is made," the rule does not specify the point at which
its application commences. One inference drawn from the absence
of any guidelines is that an issuer must cease bidding and pur-
chasing as soon as he is related to a particular distribution. 82 The
problem inherent in this analysis is its lack of specificity, for it could
be interpreted to mean that the prohibition is to begin either when
the offer is first contemplated or when preliminary agreements are
made with underwriters. 83 It has been suggested that the deter-
minative point in the case of a registered distribution is the time the
registration statement is filed, because offers for sales of the dis-
tributed security can begin at that time.184 However, since the
178 lOb-6 (a) (xi); see note 6 supra.
179 Ibid.
180 See 3 Loss 1598.
Is' Whitney, Rule 10b-6: The Special Study's Rediscovered Rule, 62 MICH. L. Rv.
567, 577 (1964).
182 See THOMAS, FEDERAL SECURITIES Acr HANDBOOK 120 (2d ed. 1960).
183 One practitioner has urged that a shareholder selling a substantial block of
securities "should stop purchasing . . . when [he has his] first conversation with the
underwriter." Remarks of Mr. Lawrence B. Morris, Jr., White & Case, in Practicing
Law Institute, S.E.C. PROBLEMs OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS AND IN UNDERWRITING 250
(Israels ed. 1962).
184 See Foshay, supra note 128, at 920-21. The author there notes that the SEC staff
does not view the time of filing as determinative of the commencement of the prohi-
bition but rather applies the prohibition to issuers about to distribute securities as well
as to those actually involved in a formal distribution.
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underwriting broker-dealer also will be making offers for sales during
this period, it is somewhat illogical to permit him to bid and pur-
chase over-the-counter until ten days prior to the effective date of
the registration and to restrict the trading of the issuer from the date
of filing; presumably both parties share a similar interest in executing
a successful offering. A more justifiable point to begin the issuer's
prohibition would be one which conforms to the limitations placed
upon underwriters. 18 5  If the ten-day cushion for over-the-counter
purchases has been found to provide sufficient time for the market to
adjust after an underwriter's trading, the same period would probably
insulate any adverse effects by an issuer's market activities. Finally,
a similar analysis suggests that the prohibition upon an issuer's ex-
change purchases should commence at the same time as the corre-
sponding restriction upon underwriters.186
Where several underwriting syndicates are bidding publicly to
secure an issue for distribution, rule lOb-6 (c) (2) (A) provides that the
prohibition on market activities begins when the prospective under-
writer has agreed to submit or has actually submitted the bid. In
practice, however, the agreement to submit a bid sometimes lacks
the definiteness assumed by the rule. While a prospective man-
aging underwriter will often send out the underwriting agreement to
syndicate members several weeks before the public bidding, pro-
vision is usually made to allow an individual underwriter to with-
draw from the syndicate within a reasonable time prior to the bidding
date. The SEC staff has said that the prohibition of lOb-6 will not
become applicable to a syndicate member's activities as long as he
retains the right to withdraw, for no legal "agreement" to bid is
present. 8 7 The staff has further expressed the opinion that, in any
case, trading should cease one day before the public bidding date.11s
This interpretation of the withdrawal provision is undesirable to
"'r See notes 177-81 supra and accompanying text.
'18 See address by Mr. David S. Ruder, November 29, 1966, Northwestern University
School of Law, before the Section on Corporate Law Departments of the Illinois State
Bar Association. In his speech entitled "Dangers in a Corporation's Purchases of Its
Own Shares," Mr. Ruder stated that "the question of when a distribution begins for
Rule lOb-6 purposes is not clear .... It may even be that the distribution commences
for the issuer at the same time that it commences for the underwriter, that is, at the
time an underwriter indicates that he will submit a proposal to engage in underwriting
the distribution." See p. 5 of Mr. Ruder's prepared remarks.
117 See Memorandum dated May 23, 1962, in the files of Sullivan & Cromwell.
28 Ibid.
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the extent that it may tend to promote schemes to avoid the lOb-6
restrictions. The present staff position, in effect, encourages mem-
bers of the underwriting group to include a withdrawal stipulation
in their agreement so that trading may be continued until the day
before the public bidding. The vice of such a result lies in the fact
that the motive behind this addition is not to provide for unforeseen
changes in the financial condition of one of the syndicate members,
but rather to avoid a legitimately enacted regulation.
The starting point for the prohibition of trading by insiders in
the Georgia-Pacific situation varies significantly from the time when
limitations are placed upon bidding and purchasing by an issuer in
the usual case. This variation probably results from the fact that
the actual distribution of shares to the shareholders of the acquired
firm may occur weeks or months preceding or subsequent to the
crucial valuation date. In future acquisitions by Georgia-Pacific,
trading by the defendant insiders is to cease "when an agreement in
principle looking towards the acquisition" of another company is
reached-"whether or not such agreement is evidenced by a formal
contract or agreement."" 9 Also, there is a ban on trading beginning
ten days prior to the date to be used in determining the number of
securities to be exchanged.
A practitioner may encounter difficulty in attempting to ascertain
when an "agreement in principle" has been reached. It is not clear
whether such a standard implies that all of the relevant terms of the
bargain have been discussed or merely that the acquiring corporation
has assented to the acquisition contingent upon a proffer of acceptable
terms. Some clarification is offered in a prospectus which was issued
by Genesco, Inc., after a confrontation with the Commission, for that
document states that "purchases will be discontinued when a definite
arrangement (as opposed to a formal contract) to make the acquisi-
tion has been made."190 Yet, the complexities of a corporate acquisi-
tion probably prevent isolation of either of the suggested stages of
negotiation. Thus, the rule of prudence should guide the corporate
insiders to taper off bidding and purchasing as soon as negotiations
become sincere and eventually to terminate all market activity in
accordance with the intensity of the bargaining.
Termination of the prohibition. The provisions in lOb-6 gov-
189 See '64-'66 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91692.
1 00 Id. at 77354.
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erning termination of the period of prohibition present an appear-
ance of clarity: an issuer may commence trading activities when the
distribution is completed; an underwriter may resume purchasing in
the market after his allotment has been distributed and after any
stabilizing arrangements or trading restrictions among the under-
writers have terminated; any other person may re-enter the market as
soon as his allotment has been distributed.191 However, because of
the inherent vagueness of the term distribution and because of vari-
ous methods employed by practitioners to accelerate the termination
date of the prohibition, these lOb-6 provisions have required ex-
tensive interpretation. For example, the SEC has ruled that a sub-
mission by the broker-dealer reporting that the offering has been
concluded is not controlling when there are indicia to the con-
trary.112 The Commission has also rejected a de minimus argument
by refusing to accept an assertion that the distribution was substan-
tially complete when all but 3,000 shares of a total offering of 290,000
shares had been sold.19 3  Finally, the general guideline which has
been presented is that the distribution will not be viewed as having
been completed, and consequently trading cannot be resumed, until
all of the securities subject to the distribution have "come to rest in
the hands of the investing public."'19
The SEC's examination of several different situations has further
clarified the delineation of the final termination point. One of the
most obviously invalid devices for advancing the termination of the
trading prohibition involves use of controlled accounts. A broker-
dealer usually attempts this deception by placing securities in a nom-
inal account and later disposing of them in the after-market while
191 Rule lOb-6 (c) (3); see note 6 supra.
192 See, e.g., R. A. Holman & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7770 (December 15,
1965), aff'd, 366 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1966) (shares reported sold were likely to be re-
turned); Mayo & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7310 (May 8, 1964) (registrant had
agreed to repurchase shares reported as sold); Batten & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release
No. 7086 (May 29, 1963), aff"d, 345 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (registrant retained control
over shares reported as having been sold to relatives); C. A. Benson & Co., SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 7044 (March 26, 1963) (shares removed from investment
account to trading account within a week after the filing of the termination report).
193 Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 10 n.20 (No-
vember 12, 1965).
194 The phrase "comes to rest in the hands of the investing public" was originally
used in Oklahoma-Texas Trust, 2 S.E.C. 764, 769 (1937), aff'd, 100 F.2d 888 (10th Cir.
1939), and later reiterated in R. A. Holman & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7770,
at 4 (December 15, 1965), aff'd, 866 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1966); Shearson Hammill & Co.,
supra note 193, at 9; Lewisohn Copper Corp., 38 S.E.C. 226, 234 (1958).
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continuing to bid so as to maintain or achieve a favorable price
level.:9 A scheme of this sort is in direct violation of lOb-6 (a) if the
broker-dealer has a beneficial interest in the nominal account. On
the other hand, factual situations involving sales made subject to
contingencies present violations which are less easily recognizable.
In this type of case, the purchaser is given the right to return the
security if certain events occur. While the Commission has not said
categorically that the distribution continues until the sale is con-
firmed by the purchaser, it has indicated that the contingent sale
will be examined' 96-especially in cases where the condition involves
a right of rejection after investigation. In order to avoid a finding
that the distribution was not completed as reported, the broker-
dealer probably should include in his termination report an indica-
tion of any questionable firmness in the transactions recorded as sales.
Sales on credit similarly impede the attempt to ascertain with pre-
cision the termination point of the lOb-6 ban on trading. The central
issue here is whether a broker-dealer can legitimately resume trading
after sales have been made of all the shares which were the subject of
the distribution but before payment for those sold on credit has been
received. The Commission has taken the position that if there is no
indication at the time of the sale or at the time of the termination re-
port that the securities may be returned, the dealer may safely resume
trading in the security.'97 However, when such an indication is
present, the SEC places the decisional responsibility upon the broker-
dealer: if he has reason to believe that the sales are not firm, he must
refrain from trading. Because of the broker-dealer's relationship to his
customers, the Commission feels that he is in the better position to
evaluate the strength of the purchaser's commitment. 98 While this
105 See James H. Price & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8052 (April 10, 1967);
R. Baruch & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7138 (September 11, 1963), supple-
mented by, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7932 (August 9, 1966).
o0See R. A. Holman & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7770, at 4 (December 15,
1965), aff'd, 366 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1966).
127 See testimony of Edward H. Emerson, Special Consultant for the Securities and
Exchange Commission, at page 1183 of Official Report of Proceeding before the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, in Batten & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7086
(May 29, 1963), aff'd, 345 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
108Id. at 1184. Another possible guideline for determining the termination point
of the period of prohibition may be inferred from the following statement: "Since
purchasers of the distributed shares in effect have 7 business days in which to pay, 48
Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78k (d) (1934); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4044,
Feb. 4, 1948; the underwriter does not know to what extent he may have cancellations
Vol. 1967: 809] RULE 10b-6
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
assumption may have validity in relation to transactions by a small
firm or to active accounts in a large firm, the financial status of in-
dividuals holding less active accounts with large firms may not be
known. Consequently, less should be expected of the dealer in the
latter situation. It is significant to note in this regard that the SEC
has not affirmatively required that the broker-dealer investigate the
exact financial status of his customers; rather, the Commission's posi-
tion seems only to imply that he must be aware of such matters as
the customer's past payment history, his willingness to deal on a cash
basis, and the general reliability of his intention to pay for the
securities purchased. In any case, whether the indications of ques-
tionable firmness are present or not, the broker-dealer is obligated,
upon the return of a portion of the offering, to suspend trading and
let the market adjust before he attempts to redistribute the shares.100
Uncertainty also exists as to the period of the 1Ob-6 prohibition
with regard to offerings of convertible securities. The difficulty re-
sults largely from the SEC's position that when convertible securities
are sold subject to a registration statement, the statement will be
considered to cover both the securities issued pursuant to the state-
ment and the securities into which they can be converted.200 Prac-
titioners have interpreted this assertion to mean that any distribution
of convertible securities will continue until all conversion rights
have either expired or been exercised.201 Although the Commission
has not formally announced its conclusion as to the applicability
of 1Ob-6 to this type of distribution, a literal application of the rule
would prohibit an issuer from bidding for or purchasing either
junior or senior securities as long as some conversions could still
occur.2 0 2  Since the issuer has little control over when conversion
until the 7 days have expired. Accordingly out of an abundance of caution, counsel
does not regard the distribution as completed until all shares have been paid for."
Bloomenthal, The Case of the Subtle Motive and the Delicate Art-Control and Dom-
ination in Over-the-Counter Securities Markets, 1960 DuKE L.J. 196, 197 n.2.
219 See testimony cited note 197 supra, at 1186.
200 See Practicing Law Institute, S.E.C. PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS AND
IN UNDERWRITING 40-41 (Israels ed. 1962).20 See Buchalter, Purchase by a Corporation of Its Shares: Corporate Cannibalism
Without Indigestion, 41 Los ANGELES B. BULL. 446, 450 n.37 (1966); Address by Mr.
David S. Ruder, Northwestern University School of Law, to Section on Corporate Law
Departments, Illinois State Bar Association, November 29, 1966.
202 This extended term for the prohibition apparently would not apply to under-
writers or other broker-dealers participating in the distribution, for rule lOb-6 (c) (3)
provides that either of these persons may resume trading when "he has distributed
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rights will be exercised, the possibility of a lengthy ban on trading is
somewhat inequitable. As an alternative to suspension of trading, the
issuer may, of course, provide a relatively short period during which
conversion would be permitted. However, much of the desirability
of convertible securities stems from the fact that a holder of such
securities may observe the business in operation before he is forced
to make a final decision as to the interest he will hold in it. Conse-
quently, shortening this period of observation would lessen the in-
vestor appeal of convertibility.
Under the Georgia-Pacific guidelines, the prohibition period com-
mencing when the acquisition agreement is reached continues until
one of the following occurs:
1. In the case of an acquisition requiring a vote of the stockholders
of an acquired company, the vote of such stockholders has been
consummated,
2. In the case of an acquisition not requiring a vote of the stock-
holders of an acquired company, the number of shares of stock
of G-P has been fixed in accordance with the terms of a binding
contract, and
3. In the case of an exchange offer subject to the registration pro-
vision of the Securities Act of 1933, such exchange offer has
finally been terminated.2 03
Since the SEC requested that similar provisions be included in the
Genesco, Inc., prospectus,20 4 these seem to be indicative of guidelines
the Commission would propose in similar cases.
EXEMPTIONS
The absoluteness of the lOb-6 ban on trading is tempered by
specified exemptions. Rule lOb-6 (a) (i) both allows a distributing
broker-dealer to make purchases from an issuer other than on a
national exchange and exempts transactions between those persons
involved in the actual distribution. Generally, this exemption is
intended to permit allocation of shares to the syndicate members and
to the selling group in preparation for an offering.20 5 Another pro-
vision exempts certain unsolicited, privately negotiated purchases. 200
his participation." An issuer, on the other hand, must wait until the distribution is
complete.
20 '64-'66 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91692.
20 Id. at 77354.
2"'See 3 Loss 1602 n.145.
201 Rule lOb-6 (a) (ii); see note 6 supra.
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This section is often employed to allow a distributor to acquire securi-
ties from a large shareholder in order that he may add them to the
securities being distributed.207 Under lOb-6 (a) (v) a broker-dealer
is allowed to place bids and make purchases pursuant to an un-
solicited request to act as a broker. This exemption is justified
because the absence of solicitation ensures that he is not raising the
market price by active trading. Also, since the bid supposedly did
not originate with the broker-dealer, the danger of its being arbi-
trarily raised is minimized.
The next exemption in 10b-6 (a) permits offers to sell or the
solicitation of offers to buy the securities to be distributed.208 By
implication, this provision emphasizes that the prohibition of 1Ob-6
extends only to bidding and purchasing. Rule lOb-6 (a) (vii) permits
any person whose trading would otherwise be prohibited by the rule
to exercise any right or conversion privilege he may possess. Also
exempted are stabilizing transactions made in accordance with rule
10b-7 and rights transactions not in violation of rule l0b-8. 20° The
placement of these rules as exemptions from the purview of 1Ob-6
reaffirms the latter as a provision presenting a general prohibition.
Because lOb-6 bears this relationship to lOb-7 or lob-8, any violation
of these latter rules necessarily involves a violation of 1Ob-6.
It is important to note that lOb-6 (e), adopted as an amendment
to lOb-6, 210 exempts employee stock plans insofar as the distribution
of the securities to the employees is concerned. This exemption
relies heavily upon the definition of employee stock plans in sec-
tions 422,211 423,212 and 424 (b)213 of the Internal Revenue Code.
While lOb-6 (e) (1) provides that distributions made to employees
under a plan which meets the criteria of these sections will not fall
within the lOb-6 prohibition, clause (e) (2) exempts a plan which
provides for periodic payments and purchases by employees or their
agent. Because of the general terms of lOb-6 (e) (2) and the conse-
quential ease with which a plan may qualify under them, that clause
2o, See 3 Loss 1602 n.146. Exemption clauses (iii) and (iv), which are for rather
specialized application, are self-explanatory. See note 6 supra.
208 Rule lOb-6 (a) (vi); see note 6 supra.
209 Rule lob-6 (a) (viii); rule lOb-6 (a) (ix); see note 6 supra.
210 See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 5208 (August 15, 1955); SEC Exchange Act
Release No. 5199 (July 19, 1955).
2 11 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 422.
212 I NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 423.
2 19 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 424 (b).
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probably encompasses most types of plans not meeting the criteria
established by the Internal Revenue Code.
Rule lOb-6 (f) provides for exemptions to be given by the SEC
on an ad hoc basis.214 In the original enactment of this provision,
the SEC declared that the section was meant "to provide for un-
usual situations which may fall within the literal language of a rule
but [which] can be demonstrated not to be comprehended within its
purpose. '2 15  The original expectation of the Commission was that
the exemptive power would "be available only on rare occasions." 216
However, some generalization can be made as to the various circum-
stances under which the power is exercised. For example, when an
employee stock plan desired to buy a portion of the shares which
its company was distributing, an exemption was allowed.217 Also, as
noted above, the Commission will often exempt purchases on a
foreign exchange made by a foreign underwriter who is undertaking
the offering of a security registered under the Securities Act in con-
nection with a broker-dealer in the United States.218 Finally, exemp-
tions from the trading prohibition have been granted in several
cases to dealers soliciting securities for non-underwritten exchanges
of stock between large insurance companies.21 9
CONCLUSION
As an attempt to preserve an undistorted market during the course
of a distribution, lOb-6 has definite value. The rule has proved
useful as a weapon with which the SEC can attack obviously manipu-
lative activities which inject an artificial character into the market at
the time of an offering. Furthermore, precedent makes fairly clear
the general categories of activities to be avoided by the broker-dealer
or issuer who legitimately desires to continue bidding and purchasing
'l See note 6 supra. The authority to grant exemptions has been vested in the
Director of the Division of Trading and Markets. SEC Exchange Act Release No.
7873 (April 27, 1966).
211 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 5194 (July 5, 1955), reprinted at 20 Fed. Reg.
5075 (1955).
231 Ibid.
21 See the Genesco, Inc. Prospectus of May 10, 1966, portions of which are reprinted
in '64-'66 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77354.
218 See Memorandum on Application of SEC Rules l0b-6, 1Ob-7 and lOb-8 to Foreign
Offerings, February 7, 1966, in the files of Sullivan & Cromwell; note 175 supra and
accompanying text.
219 See Foshay, Market Activities of Participants in Securities Distributions, 45 VA.
L. REv. 907, 931-33 (1959).
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as long as permissible. However, in relation to many matters, the
published interpretations of the rule present inadequate guidelines
for the individual seeking to conform to the rule's limitations.
While other meaningful interpretations are issued in private "no
action" letters, some matters, such as the applicability of the term
distribution to unregistered secondary distributions and the precise
point at which the prohibition on trading by issuers commences,
appear to require clarification. Until such clarifications are made,
the extent to which rule lOb-6 achieves the purpose behind its
promulgation will be limited.
